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In approaches to quantum theory in which the quantum state is regarded as a representation
of knowledge, information, or belief, two agents can assign diﬀerent states to the same quantum
system. This raises two questions: when are such state assignments compatible? and how should
the state assignments of diﬀerent agents be reconciled? In this paper, we address these questions
from the perspective of the recently developed conditional states formalism for quantum theory
[1]. Speciﬁcally, we derive a compatibility criterion proposed by Brun, Finkelstein and Mermin
from the requirement that, upon acquiring data, agents should update their states using a quantum
generalization of Bayesian conditioning. We provide two alternative arguments for this criterion,
based on the objective and subjective Bayesian interpretations of probability theory. We then apply
the same methodology to the problem of quantum state improvement, i.e. how to update your state
when you learn someone else’s state assignment, and to quantum state pooling, i.e. how to combine
the state assignments of several agents into a single assignment that accurately represents the views
of the group. In particular, we derive a pooling rule previously proposed by Spekkens and Wiseman
under much weaker assumptions than those made in the original derivation. All of our results apply
to a much broader class of experimental scenarios than have been considered previously in this
context.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Aa, 03.65.Ca, 03.65.Ta
Keywords: quantum conditional probability, quantum measurement, quantum Bayesianism, quantum state
compatibility, quantum state improvement, quantum state pooling

Contents

I. Introduction
II. Review of the conditional states
formalism
A. Basic concepts
B. The relevance of causal relations
C. Modeling classical variables
D. Bayesian conditioning
E. How to read this paper
III. Modeling experimental scenarios using
the conditional states formalism
A. Conditioning on a single classical variable
B. Conditioning on two classical variables
1. Examples of causal scenarios in which a
joint state can be assigned
2. Examples of causal scenarios in which a
joint state cannot be assigned
IV. Compatibility of quantum states
A. Objective Bayesian compatibility

∗ Electronic

2
4
4
5
6
6
7
7
7
9
10
12
12
13

address:
matt@mattleifer.info;
URL: http://mattleifer.info
† Electronic
address:
rspekkens@perimeterinstitute.ca;
URL: http://www.rwspekkens.com

B. Subjective Bayesian compatibility
C. Comparison to other approaches
1. Brun, Finkelstein and Mermin
2. Jacobs
3. Caves, Fuchs and Schack
V. Intermezzo: conditional independence
and sufficiency
A. Conditional independence
1. Classical conditional independence
2. Quantum conditional independence for
acausally related regions
3. Hybrid conditional independence
B. Suﬃcient statistics
1. Classical suﬃcient statistics
2. Hybrid suﬃcient statistics

15
17
17
17
18
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
21

VI. Quantum state improvement
22
A. General methodology for state improvement 22
B. The case of shared priors
23
C. Discussion
23
VII. Quantum state pooling
A. Review of pooling rules
B. General methodology for state pooling
C. The case of shared priors
D. Comparison to other approaches
VIII. Conclusions

24
24
25
25
27
28

2
Acknowledgments

29

References

29

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Bayesian probability theory, probabilities represent
an agent’s information, knowledge or beliefs; and hence
it is possible for two agents to assign diﬀerent probability
distributions to one and the same quantity. Recently, due
in part to the emergence of quantum information theory,
there has been a resurgence of interest in approaches to
quantum theory that view the quantum state in a similar way [2–13], and in such approaches it is possible for
two agents[56] to assign diﬀerent quantum states to one
and the same quantum system (henceforth, to avoid repetition, the term “state” will be used to refer to either
a classical probability distribution or a quantum state).
One way this can arise is when the agents have access
to diﬀering data about the system. For example, in the
BB84 quantum key distribution protocol [14], Alice, having prepared the system herself, would assign one of four
pure states to the system, whereas the best that Bob can
do before making his measurement is to assign a maximally mixed state to the system. This naturally leads to
the question of when two state assignments are compatible with one another, i.e. when can they represent validly
diﬀering views on one and the same system?
The meaning of “validly diﬀering view” depends on the
interpretation of quantum theory and, in particular, on
the status of the quantum state within it. If the quantum state is thought of as being analogous to a Bayesian
probability distribution, then the meaning of “validly differing view” also depends on precisely which approach to
Bayesian probability one is trying to apply to the quantum case. In the Jaynes-Cox approach [15, 16], sometimes called objective Bayesianism, states are taken to
represent objective information or knowledge and, given
a particular collection of known data, there is assumed
to be a unique state that a rational agent ought to assign, often derived from a rule such as the Jaynes maximum entropy principle. In contrast, in the de FinettiRamsey-Savage approach [17–21], often called subjective
Bayesianism, states are taken to represent an agent’s subjective degrees of belief and agents may validly assign different states to the same system even if they have access
to identical data about the system. This is due to diﬀering prior state assignments, the roots of which are taken
to be unanalyzable by the subjective Bayesian.
In its modern form, the problem of quantum state compatibility was ﬁrst tackled by Brun, Finkelstein and Mermin (BFM) [22–25], although this work was motivated
by earlier concerns of Peierls [26, 27]. BFM provide a
compatibility criterion for quantum states on ﬁnite dimensional Hilbert spaces. Mathematically, the criterion
is that two density operators are compatible if the intersection of their supports is nontrivial. In particular, the

BFM criterion implies that two distinct pure states are
never compatible, so that if any agent assigns a pure state
to the system then any other agent who wishes to assign
a compatible pure state must assign the same one. In
the special case of commuting state assignments, it also
implies the classical criterion for compatibility of probability distributions on ﬁnite sample spaces, which is that
there must be at least one element of the sample space
that is in the support of both distributions.
To date there have been two types of argument given
for requiring the BFM compatibility criterion: one due to
BFM themselves [24] (an argument that takes a similar
point of view was later developed by Jacobs [28]) and one
due to Caves, Fuchs and Schack (CFS) [29]. Although
not explicitly given in Bayesian terms, the BFM argument has an objective Bayesian ﬂavor in that it assumes
that there is a unique quantum state that all agents
would assign to the system if they had access to all the
available data. On the other hand, the CFS argument is
an attempt to give an explicitly subjective Bayesian argument for the BFM compatibility criterion. Both arguments start from lists of intuitively plausible criteria that
state assignments should obey, but, in our view, a more
rigorous approach is needed in order to correctly generalize the meaning that compatibility has in the classical
case.
Classically, there are two arguments for compatibility
depending on whether one adopts the objective or the
subjective approach. In both cases, compatibility is deﬁned in terms of the rules that Bayesian probability theory lays down for making probabilistic inferences, and,
in particular the requirement that, upon learning new
data, states should be updated by Bayesian conditioning. The reason for demanding an argument based on a
well-deﬁned methodology for inference is that there are
situations in which even a Bayesian would want to update their state assignment by means other than Bayesian
conditioning. For example, if you discover some information that is better represented as a constraint than as the
acquisition of new data, such as ﬁnding out the mean energy of the molecules in a gas, then minimization of relative entropy, rather than Bayesian conditioning, would
commonly be used to update probabilities [30, 31]. Arguments have also been made for applying generalizations of
Bayesian conditioning, e.g. Jeﬀrey conditioning [32, 33],
on the acquisition of new data in certain circumstances.
It is not clear whether the intuitions used by BFM and
CFS are applicable to all such circumstances and indeed
our intuitions about probabilities and quantum states are
not all that reliable in general. It is therefore important
to be clear about the type of inference procedures that
are being allowed for in any argument for a compatibility
condition.
What is missing from the existing arguments for BFM
compatibility is a speciﬁcation of precisely what sorts
of probabilistic inferences are valid — in short, a precise quantum analog of Bayesian conditioning. We have
recently proposed such an analog within the formalism
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of conditional quantum states [1]. This formalism has
the advantage of being more causally neutral than the
standard quantum formalism, by which we mean that
Bayesian conditioning is applied in the same way regardless of how the data is causally related to the system
of interest, e.g. the data could be the outcome of a direct measurement of the system, a variable involved in
the preparation of the system, the outcome of a measurement of a remote system that is correlated with the
system of interest, etc. This causal neutrality allows us to
develop arguments that are applicable in a broader range
of experimental scenarios — or more accurately, causal
scenarios — than those obtained within the conventional
formalism.
In this article, we derive BFM compatibility from the
principled application of the idea that, upon learning new
data, agents should update their states according to our
quantum analogue of Bayesian conditioning. This leaves
no room for other principles of a more ad hoc nature.
Both objective and subjective Bayesian arguments are
given by ﬁrst reviewing the corresponding classical compatibility arguments and then drawing out the parallels
to the quantum case using conditional states. The BFMJacobs and CFS arguments are then criticized in the light
of our results.
Having dealt with the question of how state assignments can diﬀer, we then turn to the question of how
to combine the state assignments of diﬀerent agents. In
Bayesian theory, the purpose of states is to provide a
guide to rational decision making via the principle of
maximizing expected utility. In its usual interpretation,
this is a rule for individual decision making that does not
take into account the views of other agents. This raises
two conceptually distinct problems.
Firstly, decision making should be performed on the
basis of all available relevant evidence. The fact that another agent assigns a particular state could be relevant
evidence, and may cause you to change your state assignment, even in the case where both state assignments
are the same. For example, if both you and I assign the
same high probability to some event, then telling you my
state assignment may cause you to assign an even higher
probability if you believe that my reasons for assigning
a high probability are valid and that they are independent of yours. Following Herbut [34], we call updating
your state assignment in light of another agent’s state
assignment state improvement.
Secondly, if two agents do have diﬀerent state assignments, then they may have diﬀerent preferences over the
available choices in decision making scenarios. In practice, decisions often have to be made as a group, in which
case a preference conﬂict prevents all the agents in the
group from maximizing their individual expected utilities simultaneously. This motivates the need for methods of combining state assignments into a single assignment that accurately represents the beliefs, information,
or knowledge of the group as a whole. This problem is
called state pooling.

In the classical case, both improvement and pooling
have been studied extensively (see [35] and [36] for reviews). From this it is clear that there is no hope of coming up with a universal rule, applicable to all cases, that
is just a simple functional of the diﬀerent state assignments. Instead, we oﬀer a general methodology for combining states, in both the classical and quantum cases,
again based on the application of Bayesian conditioning.

Learning another agent’s state assignment can be
thought of as acquiring new data. Therefore, given
our Bayesian methodology, the state improvement problem is solved by simply conditioning on this data. For
state pooling, we adopt the supra-Bayesian approach
[37], which requires the agents to put themselves in the
shoes of a neutral decision maker. Although their ability to do this is not guaranteed, doing so reduces the
pooling problem to an instance of state improvement,
i.e. the neutral decision maker’s state is conditioned on
all the other agents’ state assignments and the result is
used as the pooled state. As with compatibility, our approach to these problems is to draw out the parallels to
the classical case using conditional states and to derive
our results by a principled application of Bayesian conditioning. This is an improvement over earlier approaches
[10, 25, 28, 34, 38, 39], which use more ad hoc principles.
However, some of the results of these earlier approaches
are recovered within the present approach. In particular, a pooling rule previously proposed by Spekkens and
Wiseman [10] can be derived from our method in the special case where the minimal suﬃcient statistics for the
data collected by diﬀerent agents satisfy a condition that
is slightly weaker than conditional independence. This
is an improvement on the original derivation, which only
holds for a more restricted class of scenarios.

The results in this paper can be viewed as a demonstration of the conceptual power of the conditional states
formalism developed in [1]. However, two concepts that
were not discussed in [1] are required to develop our approach to the state improvement and pooling problems.
These are quantum conditional independence and suﬃcient statistics. Conditional independence has previously
been studied in [40], from which we borrow the required
results. Several deﬁnitions of quantum suﬃcient statistics have been given in the literature [41–43], but they
concern suﬃcient statistics for a quantum system with
respect to a classical parameter, or suﬃcient statistics
for measurement data with respect to a preparation variable. By contrast, here we need suﬃcient statistics for
classical variables with respect to quantum systems. Our
treatment of this is novel to the best of our knowledge.
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II.

REVIEW OF THE CONDITIONAL STATES
FORMALISM
A.

Basic concepts

The conditional states formalism, developed in [1],
treats quantum theory as a generalization of the classical
theory of Bayesian inference. In the quantum generalization, classical variables become quantum systems, and
normalized probability distributions over those variables
become operators on the Hilbert spaces of the systems
that have unit trace but are not always positive. The
generalization is summarized in table I, the elements of
which we now review. The treatment here is necessarily
brief. A more detailed development of the formalism and
its relation to the conventional quantum formalism can
be found in [1].
Note that we adopt the convention that classical variables are denoted by letters towards the end of the alphabet, such as R, S, T, X, Y and Z, while quantum systems
are denoted by letters near the beginning of the alphabet,
such as A, B and C.
In the classical theory of Bayesian inference, a joint
probability distribution P (R, S) describes an agent’s
knowledge, information or degrees of belief about a pair
of random variables R and S. There is no constraint on
the interpretation of what the two variables can represent. They may refer to the properties of two distinct
physical systems at a single time, or to the properties of
a single system at two distinct times, or indeed to any
pair of physical degrees of freedom located anywhere in
spacetime. They may even have a completely abstract
interpretation that is independent of physics, e.g. R
could represent acceptance or rejection of the axioms of
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory and S could be the truth
value of the Reimann hypothesis. However, given that
we are interested in quantum theory, such abstract interpretations are of less interest to us than physical ones.
The main point is that the same mathematical object, a
joint probability distribution P (R, S), is used regardless
of the interpretation of the variables in terms of physical
degrees of freedom.
The theory of quantum Bayesian inference aims to
achieve a similar level of independence from physical interpretation. In particular, we want to describe inferences about two systems at a ﬁxed time via the same
rules that are used to describe a single system at two
times. As such, the usual talk of “systems” in quantum
theory is inappropriate, as a system is usually thought
of as something that persists in time. Instead, the basic
element of the conditional states formalism is a region.
An elementary region describes what would normally be
called a system at a ﬁxed point in time and a region is
a collection of elementary regions. For example, whilst
the input and output of a quantum channel are usually
thought of as the same system in the conventional formalism, they correspond to two disjoint regions in our
terminology. This gives a greater symmetry to the case

of two systems at a single time, which also correspond to
two disjoint regions.
A region A is assigned a Hilbert space HA and a composite region AB consisting of two disjoint regions, A
and B, is assigned the Hilbert space HAB = HA ⊗ HB .
The knowledge, information, or beliefs of an agent about
AB are described by a linear operator on HAB (this operator has other mathematical properties which will be
discussed further on). This operator is called the joint
state and, for the moment, we denote it by τAB . Ideally,
one would like this framework to handle any set of regions, regardless of where they are situated in spacetime,
but unfortunately the formalism developed in [1] is not
quite up to the task. For instance, it is currently unclear
how to represent degrees of belief about three regions
that describe a system at three distinct times.
In a classical theory of Bayesian inference, one also
has the freedom to conditionalize upon any set of variables, regardless of the spatio-temporal relations that
hold among them, or indeed of the spatio-temporal relations between the conditioning variables and the conditioned variables. Therefore, this is an ideal to which a
quantum theory of Bayesian inference should also strive.
Again, the formalism of [1] does not quite achieve this
ideal. For instance, this framework cannot currently deal
with pre- and post-selection, for which the conditioning
regions straddle the conditioned system in time.
Whilst these sorts of consideration limit the scope of
our results, we are still able to treat a wide variety of
causal scenarios including all those that have been previously discussed in the literature on compatibility, improvement, and pooling. We begin by providing a synopsis of the formalism as it has been developed thus far[57].
Table I summarizes the basic concepts and formulas of
this framework and deﬁnes the terminology that we use
for them.
For an elementary region A, the quantum analogue of a
normalized probability distribution is a trace-one operator τA on HA . For a region AB, composed of two disjoint
elementary regions, the analogue of a joint distribution
P (R, S) is an operator τP
AB on HAB . The marginalization operation P (S) =
R P (R, S) which corresponds
to ignoring R, is replaced by the partial trace operation,
τB = TrA (τAB ), which corresponds to ignoring A. The
role of the marginal distribution P (S) is played by the
marginal state τB .
If A is an elementary region, then τA is also positive,
and simply corresponds to a conventional density operator on A. To highlight this fact, we denote it by ρA in
this case. The positivity of marginal states on elementary regions implies that the joint state τAB of a pair of
elementary regions must have positive partial traces (but
it need not itself be a positive operator).
Another key concept in classical probability is a conditional probability distribution P (S|R). P (S|R) represents an agent’s degrees of belief
P about S for each possible value of R. It satisﬁes
s P (S = s|R = r) =
1 for all r and is related to the joint probability by
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Classical

Quantum

P (R)

τA

P (R, S)
P
P (S) = R P (R, S)

τAB

State
Joint state
Marginalization
Conditional state

τB = TrA (τAB )

P (S|R)
P

S

P (S|R) = 1

TrB

τB|A

τB|A = IA

Relation between joint and

P (R, S) = P (S|R)P (R)

τAB = τB|A ⋆ τA

conditional states

P (S|R) = P (R, S)/P (R)

τB|A = τAB ⋆ τA−1

P (R|S) = P (S|R)P (R)/P (S)

τA|B = τB|A ⋆ (τA τB−1 )

Bayes’ theorem
Belief propagation

P (S) =

P

R

P (S|R)P (R)

τB = TrA τB|A τA



TABLE I: Analogies between the classical theory of Bayesian inference and the conditional states formalism for quantum theory.

P (S|R) = P (R, S)/P (R). This implies Bayes’ theorem,
P (R|S) = P (S|R)P (R)/P (S), which allows conditionals to be inverted. Conditional probabilities are critical
to probabilistic inference. In particular, if you assign
the conditional distribution P (S|R) and your state for
R is P (R),
P then your state for S can be computed from
P (S) = R P (S|R)P (R). This map from P (R) to P (S)
is called belief propagation.
The quantum analogue of a conditional probability is
a conditional state for region B given region A. This
is a linear operator on HAB , denoted τB|A , that satisﬁes
TrB τB|A = IA . It is related to the joint state by τB|A =
τAB ⋆ τA−1 , where the ⋆-product is deﬁned by
M ⋆ N ≡ N 1/2 M N 1/2 ,

(1)

and we have adopted the convention of dropping identity
operators and tensor products, so that τAB ⋆τA−1 is short−1/2
−1/2
hand for τAB ⋆(τA−1 ⊗IB ) = (τA ⊗IB )τAB (τA ⊗IB ).
The quantum analogue of Bayes’ theorem, relating τB|A
and τA|B , is τA|B = τB|A ⋆ (τA τB−1 ). Conditional states
are the key to inference in this framework. In particular, if you assign the conditional state τB|A and your
state for A is τA , then your
 state for B can be computed
from τB = TrA τB|A τA , where we have used the cyclic
property of the trace. This map from τA to τB is called
quantum belief propagation.
B.

The relevance of causal relations

The rules of classical Bayesian inference are independent of the causal relationships between the variables under consideration. For instance, the formula for belief
propagation from R to S does not depend on whether
R and S represent properties of distinct systems or of
the same system at two diﬀerent times. Nonetheless,

causal relations between variables can aﬀect the set of
probability distributions that are regarded as plausible
models. For example, if T is a common cause of R and
S, then R and S should be conditionally independent
given T , i.e. any viable probability model should satisfy
P (R, S|T ) = P (R|T )P (S|T ).
In the quantum case, the situation is similar. The rules
of inference, such as the formula for belief propagation,
do not depend on the causal relations between the regions
under consideration, but causal relations do aﬀect the set
of operators that can describe joint states. Indeed, the
dependence is stronger in the quantum case because the
kind of operator used depends on the causal relation even
for a pair of regions.
Suppose that A and B represent elementary regions.
A and B are causally related if there is a direct causal
inﬂuence from A to B (for instance, if A and B are the
input and the output of a quantum channel), or if there
is an indirect causal inﬂuence through other regions (for
instance, there is a sequence of channels with A as the
input to the ﬁrst and B as the output of the last). A
and B are acausally related if there is no such direct or
indirect causal connection between them, for instance, if
they represent two distinct systems at a ﬁxed time.
If A and B are acausally related, then their joint state
τAB is a positive operator. It simply corresponds to a
standard density operator for independent systems. The
conditionals τA|B and τB|A are then also positive operators. Given that ρ is the standard notation for density
operators, a joint state of two acausally related regions
is denoted ρAB . Similarly, the conditional states are denoted ρA|B and ρB|A . This notation is meant to be a
reminder of the mathematical properties of these operators. We refer to them as acausal (joint and conditional)
states.
If A and B are causally related, then τAB does not
TA
have to be a positive operator, but τAB
(or equivalently
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TB
τAB
) is always positive, where TA and TB denote partial
transpose operations on A and B[58]. Similarly, τA|B and
τB|A are not necessarily positive, but they must have
positive partial transpose. In this case, the operators
τAB , τA|B and τB|A are denoted ̺AB , ̺A|B and ̺B|A respectively and we refer to them as causal (joint and conditional) states. In particular, dynamical evolution taking ρA to ρB can be represented as quantum belief propagation using a causal conditional state ̺B|A , i.e. ρB =
TrA ̺B|A ρA . If, in the conventional formalism, the
dynamics would be described by a Completely Positive
Trace-preserving (CPT) map EB|A : L (HA ) → L (HB ),
then the corresponding conditional state ̺B|A is the operator on HA ⊗ HB that is
PJamiolkowski-isomorphic [44]
to EB|A , that is, ̺B|A = j,k |ji hk|A ⊗ EB|A′ (|ki hj|A′ ),
where HA′ is isomorphic to HA and {|ji} is any orthonormal basis for HA .

C.

Modeling classical variables

Joint, marginal and conditional classical probability
distributions are special cases of joint, marginal and conditional quantum states. To see this, note that a random variable R, with dR possible values, can be associated with a dR dimensional Hilbert space with a preferred basis {|r1 iR , |r2 iR , . . . , |rdR iR } labeled by the possible values of R. Then, a probability distribution P (R)
can be encoded in a density
P operator that is diagonal
Simiin this basis via τR =
r P (R = r) |ri hr|R .
larly, for two random variables, R and S, we can construct Hilbert spaces and preferred bases for each and
encodeP
a joint distribution P (R, S) in a joint state via
τRS = r,s P (R = r, S = s) |ri hr|R ⊗ |si hs|S , and a conditionalPdistribution P (S|R) in a conditional state via
τS|R = r,s P (S = s|R = r) |ri hr|R ⊗ |si hs|S .
Because all operators on a given classical region commute, the ⋆-product reduces to the regular operator
product for classical states, so that the formulas for
quantum Bayesian inference reduce to their classical
counterparts. For instance, the quantum Bayes’ theorem becomes τR|S = τS|R τR τS−1 , which is equivalent to
P (R|S) = P (S|R)P (R)/P (S).
Note that if we adopt the convention that partial transposes on classical regions are always deﬁned with respect
to the preferred basis, then classical joint and conditional
states are invariant under this operation. Therefore, classical causal states have the same mathematical properties as classical acausal states.[59]. Since the notational
distinction between ρ and ̺ is supposed to act as a reminder of the mathematical diﬀerence between causal
and acausal states for pairs of quantum regions, there
is no need to make the distinction for classical states.
We therefore adopt the convention of denoting classical
states over an arbitrary set of regions by ρ, regardless of
how the regions are causally related.
To complete our discussion of the basic objects in the
conditional states formalism, we need to describe how

correlations between classical and quantum regions can
be represented. The classical variable X is represented
by a Hilbert space HX with a preferred basis, as described above, and the quantum region A is associated
with a Hilbert space HA with no preferred structure.
The hybrid region XA is assigned the Hilbert space
HXA = HX ⊗ HA , but in representing correlated states
on this space, we must ensure that the classical part
remains classical. In particular, this means that there
can be no entanglement between X and A, and that
the reduced state on X must be diagonal in the preferred basis. This motivates deﬁning a hybrid quantumclassical P
operator on HXA to be an operator of the form
MXA = x |xi hx|X ⊗ MX=x,A , where each MX=x,A is
an operator on HA . The operators MX=x,A are called
the components of MXA .
PIt follows that a hybrid joint state has the form τXA =
x |xi hx|X ⊗ τX=x,A , where each component τX=x,A is
an operator on HA . Recall that if X and A are acausally
related, then τXA must be positive, while if X and A are
TA
causally related, then τXA
must be positive. However,
given the form of a hybrid state, τXA is positive if and
TA
only if τXA
is positive, so the two conditions are equivalent. Consequently, causal and acausal states on hybrid
regions correspond to the same set of operators. Therefore, as for classical states, ρ is used to denote all hybrid
states, regardless of their causal interpretation.
By calculating the marginal state ρX and ρA from the
hybrid state ρAX , we can deﬁne conditional states as
−1
−1
ρX|A = ρAX ⋆ ρ−1
A and ρA|X = ρAX ⋆ ρX = ρAX ρX .
In the latter case, the ⋆-product reduces to the regular operator product because X is classical. There are
two sorts of conditional states for hybrid systems corresponding to whether the quantum or the classical region is on the right of the conditional. If the conditioning system is quantum,
then the conditional state has
P
|xi
hx|X ⊗ ρX=x|A where ρX=x|A
the form ρX|A =
P x
is positive and
ρ
x X=x|A = IA . It follows that the
set of operators {ρX=x|A} is a Positive Operator Valued
Measure (POVM) and therefore such conditional states
can be used to represent measurements, a fact that we
shall make use of in §III A. If the conditioning system is classical,
then the conditional state has the form
P
ρA|X = x ρA|X=x
 ⊗ |xi hx|X where ρA|X=x is positive
and TrA ρA|X=x = 1 for all x. The operators {ρA|X=x }
therefore constitute a set of normalized states on A, and
can therefore be used to represent state preparations, a
fact that will also be used in §III A.

D.

Bayesian conditioning

Classically, if you are interested in a random variable
R, and you learn that a correlated variable X takes the
value x, then you should update your probability distribution for R from the prior, P (R), to the posterior,
P (R|X = x). This is known as Bayesian Conditioning.
In the conditional states formalism, whenever there is
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a hybrid region, regardless of the causal relationship between the classical variable X and the quantum region
A, you can always assign a joint state ρXA . When you
learn that X takes the value x, the state of the quantum
region should be updated from ρA to ρA|X=x . This is
quantum Bayesian conditioning.

B

X
E.

How to read this paper

This article is mainly concerned with the consequences
of conditioning a quantum region on classical data, so the
main objects of interest are hybrid conditional states with
classical conditioning regions. In this case the set of operators under consideration does not depend on the causal
relation between the two regions. However, thus far we
have only considered conditioning a quantum region on a
single classical variable. Suppose instead that you learn
the values of two classical variables, X1 and X2 , and you
want to update your beliefs about a quantum region A.
In this case, there are some causal scenarios where your
beliefs cannot be correctly represented by a joint state
ρAX1 X2 . In such scenarios, our results do not apply.
To properly explain the distinction between the types
of causal scenario to which our results apply and those to
which they do not requires delving into the conditional
states formalism in more detail. However, this extra material is not necessary for understanding most of our results, so the reader who is eager to get to the discussion of
compatibility, improvement and pooling can skip ahead
to §IV, referring back to §III as necessary.
The next section covers the required background for
understanding the scope of our results and gives several
examples of experimental scenarios to which our results
apply. In particular, all of the causal scenarios that have
been considered to date in the literature on compatibility,
improvement, and pooling are within the scope of our
results. Indeed, given that all previous results have been
derived in the context of speciﬁc causal scenarios, our
results represent a substantial increase in the breadth of
applicability, even if they do not yet cover all conceivable
cases.

III.

MODELING EXPERIMENTAL SCENARIOS
USING THE CONDITIONAL STATES
FORMALISM

Table II translates various concepts and formulas from
the conventional quantum formalism into the language of
conditional states. These correspondences are described
in more detail in [1]. The meaning of most of the rows
should be evident from the discussion in the previous section, and the rest are explained in this section as needed.
We begin by showing how conditioning a quantum region on a single classical variable works in several diﬀerent experimental scenarios. This is necessary background
knowledge for considering the more relevant scenarios in-

(a)

X

X

A

B
(b)

B
(c)

FIG. 1: Quantum-classical hybrid regions with diﬀerent
causal relations. Triangles represent classical variables (as
suggested by the shape of the probability simplex) and circles represent quantum regions (as suggested by the spherical
state space of a qubit). (a) Preparation procedure: a quantum region B is prepared in one of a set of states depending
on the value of a classical variable X (B is in the causal future
of X). (b) Remote measurement: a measurement is made on
A, which is acausally related to B. The classical outcome
X is then acausally related to B. (c) Measurement: a measurement is made on a quantum region B and the classical
variable X represents the outcome (X is in the causal future
of B).

volving conditioning on a pair of variables. The diﬀerent experiments correspond to diﬀerent causal structures,
which are illustrated by directed acyclic graphs.

A.

Conditioning on a single classical variable

In this section, the quantum region we are interested
in making inferences about is always denoted B and the
classical variable on which the inference is based is denoted X.
Example III.1. Consider the following preparation procedure. A classical random variable X with probability distribution P (X) is generated by ﬂipping coins,
rolling dice or any other suitable procedure, and then
a quantum region is prepared in a state ρB
x depending on the value of X obtained. This scenario is depicted in ﬁg. 1a. Suppose that, initially, you do not
know the value of X that was obtained in this procedure. In the conditional states formalism, your beliefs
about X are represented by a diagonal state ρX with
components ρX=x ≡ P (X = x). The set of states prepared is represented by a conditional state ρB|X with
components ρB|X=x ≡ ρB
x . Since the ⋆-product reduces
to a regular product for classical states, the joint state
of XB is ρXB = ρB|X ρX . In terms of components, this
P
is ρXB = x P (X = x) |xi hx|X ⊗ ρB
x . It follows that
ρXB contains suﬃcient information to describe an ensemble of states, i.e. a set of states supplemented with a
probability distribution over them. Tracing
P over X gives
the marginal ρB = TrX ρB|X ρX = x P (X = x)ρB
x,
which is easily recognized as the ensemble average state
on B.
According to the conventional formalism, upon learn-
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Conventional Notation

Conditional States Formalism

P (X)

ρX

P (X = x)

ρX=x

{ρA
x}

ρA|X

ρA
x

ρA|X=x

{ExA }

ρX|A

Individual effect on A

ExA

ρX=x|A

Channel from A to B

EB|A

̺B|A

Probability distribution of X
Probability that X = x
Set of states on A
Individual state on A
POVM on A

B|A

{Ex

Instrument
Individual Operation
The Born rule
Ensemble averaging
Action of a quantum channel
Composition of channels
State update rule

}

̺XB|A

B|A
Ex

̺X=x,B|A

∀x : P (X = x) = TrA ExA ρA
ρA =

P

x



P (X = x)ρA
x

ρX = TrA ρX|A ρA



ρA = TrX ρA|X ρX





ρB = EB|A (ρA )

ρB = TrA ̺B|A ρA

EC|A = EC|B ◦ EB|A

̺C|A = TrB ̺C|B ̺B|A

B|A

∀x : P (X = x)ρB
x = Ex

(ρA )

ρXB = TrA ̺XB|A ρA





TABLE II: Translation of concepts and equations from conventional notation to the conditional states formalism.

ing that X takes the value x, you should assign the state
that was prepared for that particular value of X to B,
B
which is just ρB
x . However, since ρB|X=x = ρx in the
conditional states formalism, this update has the form
ρB → ρB|X=x , so it is an example of quantum Bayesian
conditioning. The interpretation of conditioning in this
scenario is as an update from the ensemble average state
to a particular state in the ensemble.
Example III.2. Suppose that A and B are two acausally
related quantum regions to which you assign the state
ρAB . The (prior) reduced state on B is ρB = TrA (ρAB ).
Now suppose that you make a measurement on A with
outcome described by the variable X and that the measurement is associated with a POVM {ExA }. In the conditional states formalism, the measurement is represented
by a conditional state ρX|A , where ρX=x|A ≡ ExA . We
are interested in how the state for B gets updated upon
learning the outcome x of X. This causal scenario is depicted in ﬁg. 1b. This is the scenario that occurs in the
EPR experiment, or more generally in “quantum steering”. The update map in this case is sometimes called a
“remote collapse rule”.
In the conditional states formalism, the joint state on
XB can be determined by belief propagation from A to
X, i.e. ρXB = TrA ρX|A ρAB . The marginal on X
gives the outcome probabilities for the measurement and
is given by ρX = TrB (ρBX ). From these, the conditional

state ρB|X is determined via ρB|X = ρBX ρ−1
X . By substituting X = x into the expression for ρB|X , we obtain
ρB|X=x . This is the state that you should assign to B
when you learn that X = x, i.e. the update rule for the remote region is just Bayesian conditioning ρB → ρB|X=x .
The updated state ρB|X=x can be expressed in terms of
the givens in the problem, i.e. the state ρAB and the
POVM elements ExA , but this is not especially instructive for present purposes. Interested readers can consult
[1], where it is shown that this form of Bayesian conditioning is precisely the same as the usual remote collapse
rule in the conventional formalism.
Example III.3. Consider the case where X represents the
outcome of a direct measurement made on B and you
want to condition the state of B on the value of this outcome. This causal scenario is depicted in ﬁg. 1c, and is
described by an input state ρB and a conditional state
ρX|B with components given by the POVM that is being
measured. The conditional ρB|X=x is then the X = x
component of ρB|X , which can be computed from an

−1
application of Bayes’ theorem
ρ
=
ρ
⋆
ρ
ρ
,
B
B|X
X|B
X

where ρX = TrB ρX|B ρB . The operator ρB|X=x is the
state that should be assigned to region B upon learning
that the outcome X takes the value x.
Note that Bayesian conditioning in this case is a kind
of retrodiction: the region being conditioned upon, the
outcome of the measurement, is to the future of the con-
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B
X

A
FIG. 2: Causal scenario for describing measurement update
rules, or quantum instruments. A represents the system before the measurement, X is the measurement outcome and B
is the system after the measurement has been completed.

ditioned region, the quantum input to the measurement.
This application of Bayesian conditioning to retrodiction
is discussed in detail in [1] and is shown to generate precisely the same operational consequences as would be obtained in the conventional formalism for retrodiction.
Example III.4. Finally, consider a direct measurement
again, but where the region of interest is the quantum
output of the measurement rather than its input. Let A
and B denote the input and output respectively. Since
these are distinct regions, they must be given distinct
labels in the conditional states formalism, whereas conventionally they would be given the same label as they
represent the same system at two diﬀerent times. The
classical variable representing the outcome is X. We are
interested in how the state of B should be updated upon
learning the value of X. The relevant causal structure
is depicted in ﬁg. 2. The causal arrow from X to B
represents the fact that the post-measurement state can
depend on the measurement outcome in addition to the
pre-measurement state.
In general, the rule for determining the state of the region after the measurement, given the state of the region
before the measurement and the outcome, is not uniquely
determined by the POVM associated with the measurement. The most general possible rule is conventionally
represented by a quantum instrument, which is a set of
B|A
trace-nonincreasing completely positive maps, {Ex }.
B|A
The operation Ex
maps a pre-measurement state ρA
to the unnormalized post-measurement state that should
B|A
be assigned when the outcome is x, i.e. Ex (ρA ) =
B
P (X = x)ρx , where P (X = x) is the probability of
obtaining outcome x and ρB
x is the normalized postmeasurement state. This implies that if a measurement
is associated with a POVM 
{ExA }, then the quantum in
B|A
strument must satisfy TrB Ex (ρA ) = TrA ExA ρA
for all input states ρA .
It is not too diﬃcult to see how to represent a quantum
instrument in the conditional states formalism. First,
note that the measurement generates an ensemble of
states for B, i.e. for each possible outcome X = x there
is a probability P (X = x), given by the Born rule, and
a corresponding state ρB
x for B, which is the state that

should be assigned to B when the outcome X = x occurs. We have already seen that an ensemble of states
can be written asP
a joint state ρXB of the hybrid region
XB via ρXB = x P (X = x) |xi hx|X ⊗ ρB
x . What is
needed then, is a way of determining a joint state ρXB
of XB, given a state ρA of region A. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this can be done by specifying a causal conditional state ̺XB|A and using belief propagation to obtain
ρXB = TrA ̺XB|A ρA . The POVM that is measured by
this procedure is given by the components
of the condi
tional state ̺X|A = TrB ̺XB|A . The precise relation
B|A
between the instrument {Ex } and the causal conditional state ̺XB|A is obtained through the Jamiolkowski
isomorphism and is described in [1].
If you assign a prior state ρA to the region before
the measurement, and describe the quantum instrument implementing the measurement by ̺XB|A , then
the ensemble of output states is described by ρXB =
TrA ρXB|A ρA . The marginal state ρB = TrX (ρXB ) is
then your prior state for the output region and ρX =
TrB (ρXB ) gives the Born rule probabilities for the measurement outcomes. The states in the ensemble, ρB|X=x ,
can then be computed from the conditional ρB|X =
ρXB ρ−1
X . Upon learning that X = x, you should update your beliefs about B by Bayesian conditioning, i.e.
by the rule ρB → ρB|X=x .
Note that Bayesian conditioning is not a rule that
maps your prior state about the measurement’s input
to your posterior state about the measurement’s output,
which would be a map of the form ρA → ρB|X=x . The
projection postulate is an instance of this latter kind of
update, but it is not an instance of Bayesian conditioning. Bayesian conditioning is a map from prior states
to posterior states of one and the same region. The map
ρB → ρB|X=x , which takes the prior state of the measurement’s output to the posterior state of the measurement’s
output is an instance of quantum Bayesian conditioning.
In the conventional formalism it corresponds to a transition from the output of a non-selective state-update rule,
which you would apply when you know that a measurement has occurred but not which outcome was obtained,
to the output of the corresponding selective state-update
rule, which applies when you do know the outcome.

B.

Conditioning on two classical variables

The problems discussed in this paper concern inferences made by multiple (typically two) agents based on
diﬀerent data. Thus, we are interested in conditioning a
quantum region on the values of more than one classical variable, which may or may not be known to all the
agents.
It is convenient to introduce a few more notational
conventions to handle such scenarios. Since we are using letters to denote regions, we use numbers to refer to
agents. Given that regions A and B are prominent in
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our article, it is confusing to use the usual names Alice
and Bob for our numbered agents, so we refer to agent
1 as Wanda and agent 2 as Theo. Occasionally, we will
refer to a decision-maker, whom we call Debbie, and for
which we use the number 0. A classical variable that
agent j learns during the course of their inference procedure is denoted Xj . The quantum region about which
the agents are making inferences is denoted B, and, when
making analogies between quantum theory and classical
probability theory, the classical variable analogous to B
is denoted Y . Any other auxiliary quantum regions involved in setting up the causal scenario are denoted A
(or A1 , A2 , . . . if there is more than one of them) and
auxiliary classical variables are denoted Z (or Z1 , Z2 , . . .
if there is more than one of them).
Depending on the causal relations between the classical
variables Xj and an elementary quantum region B, it is
possible to construct scenarios in which the available information about the quantum region cannot be summed
up by the assignment of a single state (positive density
operator) to the region. For example, this is familiar in
the case of pre- and post-selected ensembles, which are
described by a pair of states rather than a single state
in the formalism of Aharonov et. al. [45]. Although our
results apply to a much wider variety of causal scenarios
than those typically discussed in the literature on compatibility, improvement, and pooling, we still do not consider situations in which the region of interest has to be
described by a more exotic object than a single quantum
state. Of course, a general quantum theory of Bayesian
inference should be able to address such scenarios, but
that is a topic for future work.
Mathematically speaking, our results apply whenever
the following condition holds:
Condition III.5. The joint region consisting of the
quantum region of interest, B, and all the classical variables involved in the inference procedure, X1 , X2 . . ., can
be assigned a joint state ρBX1 X2 ... (which may be either
an acausal or a causal state).
Consider the case of two classical variables, X1 and X2 ,
and suppose that a joint state ρBX1 X2 exists. From this,
one can compute the reduced states ρB , ρX1 and ρX2 , and
the joint states ρBX1 , ρBX2 and ρX1 X2 . From these, one
can easily compute the conditional states ρB|X1 , ρB|X2
and ρB|X1 X2 . If Wanda learns that X1 = x1 then she
updates ρB to her posterior state ρB|X1 =x1 , and if Theo
learns that X2 = x2 then he updates ρB to his posterior state ρB|X2 =x2 . An agent who learns both outcomes
would update to ρB|X1 =x1 ,X2 =x2 . The existence of the
joint state ρX1 X2 B ensures that all the posterior states
ρB|X1 =x1 , ρB|X2 =x2 and ρB|X1 =x1 ,X2 =x2 are well deﬁned.
Similar comments apply when there are more than two
classical variables.
In the remainder of this section, we give several examples of causal scenarios in which this condition does
apply, in order to emphasize the generality of our results, and we provide some examples where it does not,

B

X2

X1

(a)

X2

X2

X1

X1

B

A

(b)

B

(c)

FIG. 3: Introducing an extra classical variable to the causal
scenarios depicted in ﬁg. 1 via post-processing.

to clarify the limitations to their applicability. All the
examples involve inferences about a quantum region B
based on two classical variables X1 and X2 .
1.

Examples of causal scenarios in which a joint state can
be assigned

Example III.6. Perhaps the simplest class of causal scenarios in which a joint state can be assigned are those
in which the second variable X2 is obtained via a postprocessing of the variable X1 , i.e. X2 is obtained from X1
via conditional probabilities P (X2 |X1 ), or equivalently a
classical conditional state ρX2 |X1 . Only X1 is directly
related to the quantum region B and any correlations
between X2 and B are mediated by X1 . Examples of
this sort of causal scenario are depicted in ﬁg. 3.
In all these scenarios, we already know from §III A that
BX1 can be assigned a joint state ρBX1 and then the joint
state of BX1 X2 is just
ρBX1 X2 = ρX2 |X1 ρBX1 ,

(2)

so condition III.5 is satisﬁed. These examples are important because they imply that arbitrary classical processing may be performed on a classical variable without
changing our ability to assign a joint state. In particular,
this is used in §V B where hybrid suﬃcient statistics are
deﬁned as a kind of processing of a classical data variable.

B
X1

X2

Z
FIG. 4: Wanda and Theo learn variables that are correlated
with a variable used to prepare region B.

Example III.7. Consider a generalization of the preparation scenario depicted in ﬁg. 1a to the scenario depicted
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in ﬁg. 4, which adds two further classical variables that
depend on the preparation variable. In this scenario, a
classical random variable Z is sampled from a probability distribution P (Z) and, upon obtaining the outcome
Z = z, a region B is prepared in the state ρB|Z=z . Some
data about Z is revealed to the two agents: X1 to Wanda,
and X2 to Theo. X1 and X2 may be coarse-grainings of
Z, or they may even depend on Z stochastically. For
example, if Z is the outcome of a dice roll, then X1 and
X2 could both be binary variables, with X1 indicating
whether Z is odd or even and X2 indicating whether it
is ≤ 3. Generally, the dependence of X1 and X2 on Z is
given by classical conditional states ρX1 |Z and ρX2 |Z . A
joint state for X1 X2 B can be deﬁned in this case via

(3)
ρX1 X2 B = TrZ ρX1 |Z ρX2 |Z ρB|Z ρZ ,
so, again,condition III.5 is satisﬁed.

X1

X2

X1

X2

Z

B
FIG. 6: Wanda and Theo learn variables derived from a direct
measurement made on region B.

by conditional states ρX1 |Z and ρX2 |Z . In this case, a
joint state ρX1 X2 B can be deﬁned as


ρX1 X2 B = TrZ ρX1 |Z ρX2 |Z ρZ|B ⋆ ρB ,
(5)
and conditioning on values of the classical variables yields
states that are relevant for retrodiction.

B
A1

B

A2

X2

FIG. 5: Wanda and Theo learn about B by making measurements on two acausally related regions A1 and A2 .

A2
Example III.8. Consider the generalization of the remote
measurement scenario depicted in ﬁg. 1b to a pair of remote measurements, as depicted in ﬁg. 5. This scenario
is in fact the one that is adopted in much of the literature
on compatibility and pooling [10, 24, 25]. The region of
interest, B, is acausally related to two other quantum
regions, A1 and A2 , so we have a tripartite state ρA1 A2 B .
Direct measurements are made on A1 and A2 , with outcomes X1 and X2 respectively, and which are described
by the conditional states ρX1 |A1 and ρX2 |A2 respectively.
It is assumed that Wanda learns only X1 and Theo learns
only X2 . In this case, we can deﬁne a tripartite acausal
state by

(4)
ρX1 X2 B = TrA1 A2 ρX1 |A1 ρX2 |A2 ρA1 A2 B .

Example III.9. Consider a generalization of the direct
measurement scenario depicted in ﬁg. 1c to the scenario
of ﬁg. 6, which introduces two further classical variables
that depend on the measurement result. This is similar
to the second example considered in this section except
that, rather than Z being used to prepare B, it is now obtained by making a direct measurement on B, described
by the conditional state ρZ|B . As before, some information about Z is distributed to each agent, speciﬁcally,
variables X1 and X2 to Wanda and Theo respectively.
The dependence of X1 and X2 on Z is again described

X1

A1
FIG. 7: Wanda and Theo learn the results of two measurements preformed in sequence.

Example III.10. Consider a generalization of the measurement scenario depicted in ﬁg. 2 to a case where a
pair of measurements are implemented in succession, as
depicted in ﬁg. 7. This scenario has been considered in
the context of compatibility and pooling by Jacobs [28],
as discussed in §IV C 2. The input region of the ﬁrst measurement is denoted A1 . The output of the ﬁrst measurement, which is also the input of the second, is denoted A2 ,
and the output of the second measurement, which is the
region about which Wanda and Theo seek to make inferences, is denoted by B. The classical variables describing
the outcomes of the two measurements are denoted X1
and X2 respectively, and it is assumed that Wanda learns
X1 while Theo learns X2 .
Suppose that Wanda and Theo agree on the input state
ρA1 and on the causal conditional states, ̺X1 A2 |A1 and
̺X2 B|A2 , that describe the measurements. A joint state
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can then be assigned to X1 X2 B via


ρX1 X2 B = TrA1 A2 ̺X2 B|A2 ̺X1 A2 |A1 ρA1 .
The interpretation
measurements can
cedure for B that
ρX1 X2 B depending

(6)

of eq. (6) is that the two consecutive
be thought of as a preparation proprepares the states in the ensemble
on the values of X1 and X2 .

These examples should serve to give an idea of the type
of scenarios to which our results apply.

2.

Then, ρB|X1 =x1 is a deﬁnite state in the {|0iB , |1iB }
basis and ρB|X2 =x2 is a deﬁnite state in the {|+iB , |−iB }
basis. Any putative ρB|X1 =x1 ,X2 =x2 , derived from a joint
state of all three regions, would then have to have deﬁnite
values for measurements in both the {|0iB , |1iB } basis
and in the {|+iB , |−iB } basis. There is no state with this
property because these are complimentary observables.
Conditioning on both X1 = x1 and X2 = x2 represents a case of pre- and post-selection, and, as argued by
Aharonov et. al. [45], the concept of a quantum state has
to be generalized in order to handle such cases.

Examples of causal scenarios in which a joint state
cannot be assigned

X1

X2

A

B

X2

FIG. 9: Learning both the outcome of a direct measurement
and the outcome of a remote measurement.

B

X1
FIG. 8: Wanda learns a preparation variables and Theo learns
a measurement variable. Learning both variables gives a preand post-selected ensemble.

Example III.11. Consider the prepare-and-measure scenario depicted in ﬁg. 8. Here, B is prepared in a state
depending on the preparation variable X1 and then B
is measured, resulting in the outcome X2 . More concretely, consider the case where B is a qubit prepared in
the {|0iB , |1iB } basis and measured in the {|+iB , |−iB }
basis, where |±i = √12 (|0i ± |1i). Suppose that X2 takes
the value X2 = 0 for |+iB and X2 = 1 for |−iB . Although it is possible to assign joint states to X1 B and to
X2 B, the conditional states that these assignments imply
are not compatible with any joint state for X1 X2 B.
To see this, note that the joint states for X1 B and X2 B
have to be of the form
ρX1 B = P (X1 = 0) |0i h0|X1 ⊗ |0i h0|B
+ P (X1 = 1) |1i h1|X1 ⊗ |1i h1|B

Example III.12. Consider two acausally related quantum
regions A and B. Here, B is the region of interest, but direct measurements are made on both A and B, resulting
in the classical variables X1 and X2 respectively. This is
depicted in ﬁg. 9. Formally, this is very similar to preand post-selection and a joint state of X1 X2 B is ruled
out for similar reasons.
Suppose that A and B are qubits and that ρAB =
|Ψ− i hΨ− |AB is a singlet state, where |Ψ− iAB =
√1 (|01i − |10i)
AB . If X1 is the result of a measurement
2
of A in the {|0iA , |1iA } basis and X2 is the result of measuring B in the {|+iB , |−iB } basis then, as before, the
state ρB|X1 =x1 would have to be a deﬁnite state in the
{|0iB , |1iB } basis and ρB|X2 =x2 would have to be a definite state in the {|+iB , |−iB } basis. The putative joint
state would then have to have a conditional with components ρB|X1 =x1 ,X2 =x2 that are deﬁnite in both bases,
which is not possible in the formalism as it currently
stands.

IV.

COMPATIBILITY OF QUANTUM STATES

(7)

ρX2 B = P (X2 = 0) |0i h0|X2 ⊗ |+i h+|B
+ P (X2 = 1) |1i h1|X2 ⊗ |−i h−|B , (8)
where P (X1 ) is the distribution of the preparation variable and P (X2 ) is the Born rule probability distribution
for the outcomes of the measurement.

This section describes our Bayesian approach to the
compatibility of quantum states. We give alternative
derivations of the BFM compatibility criterion from the
point of view of objective and subjective Bayesianism. In
each case, we begin by reviewing the corresponding argument in the classical case in order to build intuition,
and draw out the parallels to the quantum case using the
conditional states formalism.
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A.

Objective Bayesian compatibility

First consider compatibility for a classical random variable Y . For the objective Bayesian, the only way that two
agents’ probability assignments can diﬀer is if they have
had access to diﬀerent data, so suppose Wanda learns
the value of a random variable X1 and Theo learns the
value of a diﬀerent random variable X2 . According to
the objective Bayesian, there is a unique prior probability distribution P (Y, X1 , X2 ) that both Wanda and
Theo ought to initially assign to the three variables before
they have observed the values of the Xj ’s. Both Wanda
and Theo’s prior P
distribution for Y alone is simply the
marginal P (Y ) = X1 ,X2 P (Y, X1 , X2 ). Upon observing
a particular value xj of Xj , Wanda and Theo update to
their posterior distributions P (Y |Xj = xj ).
Now suppose that we don’t know the details of how
Wanda and Theo arrived at their probability assignments
and we are simply told that, at some speciﬁc point in
time, Wanda assigns some distribution Q1 (Y ) to Y and
Theo assigns a distribution Q2 (Y ) (diﬀerent from Q1 (Y )
in general). For the objective Bayesian, this can only
arise in the manner described above, so the notion of
compatibility is deﬁned as follows.
Definition IV.1 (Classical objective Bayesian compatibility). Two probability distributions Q1 (Y ) and Q2 (Y )
are compatible if it is possible to construct a pair of
random variables, X1 and X2 , and a joint distribution P (Y, X1 , X2 ) such that Q1 (Y ) can be obtained by
Bayesian conditioning on X1 = x1 for some value x1 ,
and Q2 (Y ) can be obtained by Bayesian conditioning on
X2 = x2 for some value x2 , that is,
Qj (Y ) = P (Y |Xj = xj )

(9)

for some values xj of Xj . Further, we require that
P (X1 = x1 , X2 = x2 ) 6= 0 so that there is a possibility for both outcomes to be obtained simultaneously.
This deﬁnition of compatibility is equivalent to the requirement that the supports of Q1 (Y ) and Q2 (Y ) have
nontrivial intersection, where the support of a probability distribution P (Y ) is deﬁned as supp[P (Y )] ≡
{y | P (Y = y) > 0}.
Theorem IV.2. Two distributions Q1 (Y ) and Q2 (Y )
satisfy definition IV.1, i.e. they are compatible in the objective Bayesian sense, iff they share some common support, i.e.
supp [Q1 (Y )] ∩ supp [Q2 (Y )] 6= ∅.

{y | P (Y = y) = 0}, i.e. ker [P (Y )] is the complement of
supp [P (YP)]. Let y ∈ ker [P (Y )]. Since P (Y = y) = 0,
we have x′ P (Y = y, X = x′ ) = 0, which implies that
P (Y = y, X = x′ ) = 0 for every value x′ and consequently that P (Y = y|X = x) = 0. In other words,
y ∈ ker [P (Y )] implies y ∈ ker [P (Y |X = x)], which
means that ker [P (Y )] ⊆ ker [P (Y |X = x)], or equivalently supp [P (Y |X = x)] ⊆ supp [P (Y )].
Proof of theorem IV.2.
The “only if ” half :
It is given that there is a joint distribution P (Y, X1 , X2 )
such that Qj (Y ) = P (Y |Xj = xj ). Since P (X1 =
x1 , X2 = x2 ) 6= 0, P (Y |X1 = x1 , X2 = x2 ) exists and, by
lemma IV.3, it must satisfy
supp [P (Y |X1 = x1 , X2 = x2 )] ⊆
supp [P (Y |X1 = x1 )]

(11)

supp [P (Y |X1 = x1 , X2 = x2 )] ⊆
supp [P (Y |X2 = x2 )] .

(12)

Since every probability distribution has nontrivial support, supp[P (Y |X1 = x1 , X2 = x2 )] 6= ∅, so
supp [P (Y |X1 = x1 )] ∩ supp [P (Y |X2 = x2 )] 6= ∅. (13)
The “if ” half :
Given that Q1 (Y ) and Q2 (Y ) have intersecting support,
one can ﬁnd a normalized probability distribution Q0 (Y )
such that
Q1 (Y ) = p1 Q0 (Y ) + (1 − p1 ) Q′1 (Y ),
Q2 (Y ) = p2 Q0 (Y ) + (1 − p2 ) Q′2 (Y ),

where Q′1 (Y ) and Q′2 (Y ) are each normalized probability
distributions and 0 < p1 , p2 ≤ 1.
This decomposition can be used to construct two random variables, X1 and X2 , and a joint distribution
P (Y, X1 , X2 ) such that P (X1 = x1 , X2 = x2 ) 6= 0 and
Qj (Y ) = P (Y |Xj = xj ) for some values x1 and x2 . Let
X1 and X2 be bit-valued variables that take values {0, 1},
and deﬁne
P (Y |X1 = 0, X2 = 0) = Q0 (Y )
P (Y |X1 = 0, X2 = 1) = Q′1 (Y )
P (Y |X1 = 1, X2 = 0) = Q′2 (Y ).

The proof makes use of the following lemma.

Proof. The condition P (X = x) 6= 0 implies that P (Y =
y|X = x) is well deﬁned for all y. Let ker [P (Y )] =

(16)
(17)
(18)

The result of conditioning on (X1 = 1, X2 = 1) can be
taken to be an arbitrary distribution, denoted by N (Y ),
i.e.

(10)

Lemma IV.3. If a probability distribution P (X, Y ) satisﬁes P (X = x) 6= 0 then supp [P (Y |X = x)] ⊆
supp [P (Y )].

(14)
(15)

P (Y |X1 = 1, X2 = 1) = N (Y ).

(19)

Next, deﬁne the following distribution over X1 and X2 :
P
P
P
P

(X1
(X1
(X1
(X1

= 0, X2
= 0, X2
= 1, X2
= 1, X2

= 0) = p1 p2
= 1) = (1 − p1 )p2
= 0) = p1 (1 − p2 )
= 1) = (1 − p1 ) (1 − p2 ) .

(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
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Using these, we can deﬁne P (Y, X1 , X2 )
=
P (Y |X1 , X2 )P (X1 , X2 ).
It is straightforward to
verify that this satisﬁes P (X1 = 0, X2 = 0) = p1 p2 > 0
and that P (Y |X1 = 0) and P (Y |X2 = 0) are equal to
the right-hand sides of eqs. (14) and (15). Consequently,
they are equal to Q1 (Y ) and Q2 (Y ) respectively.
The “only if” part of the proof of theorem IV.2 establishes that intersecting supports is a necessary requirement for objective Bayesian state assignments. On the
other hand, the “if” part only establishes suﬃciency for
causal scenarios that support generic joint states. For a
given causal scenario, i.e. a given set of causal relations
holding among Y , X1 and X2 , there may be restrictions
on the joint probability distributions that can arise. As
an extreme example, if the causal structure is such that
the composite variable Y X1 and the elementary variable X2 are neither connected by some direct or indirect
causal inﬂuence, nor connected by a common cause, then
they will be statistically independent and the joint distribution will factorize as P (Y, X1 , X2 ) = P (Y, X1 )P (X2 ).
Under such a restriction, there are certain pairs of states
Q1 (Y ) and Q2 (Y ) that have intersecting support, but
Wanda and Theo could never come to assign them by
conditioning on X1 and X2 . For instance, in the example just mentioned, Q2 (Y ) must be equal to the prior
over Y and consequently, by lemma IV.3, the only pairs
Q1 (Y ) and Q2 (Y ) that can arise by such conditioning
are pairs for which the support of Q1 (Y ) is contained in
that of Q2 (Y ). Therefore, not every pair of compatible
state assignments will arise in a given causal scenario. On
the other hand, in “generic” scenarios wherein the causal
structure does not force any conditional independences in
the joint distribution over Y , X1 and X2 , the “if” part
of the proof does establish that any pair of states with
intersecting support can arise as the state assignments of
a pair of objective Bayesian agents.
Turning now to the quantum case, consider a quantum region B with Hilbert space HB . For the objective
Bayesian the only way that two agents’ state assignments
to B can diﬀer is if they have access to diﬀerent data. We
represent this data by two random variables X1 and X2 ,
where Wanda has access to X1 and Theo has access to
X2 . Assume that the causal scenario of the experiment
can be described by a joint state on the hybrid region
BX1 X2 , as discussed in §III B.
Given that this is an objective Bayesian approach, before Wanda and Theo observe the values of the Xj ’s,
there is a unique prior state ρBX1 X2 which they should
both assign, the prior state for B alone being ρB =
TrX1 X2 (ρBX1 X2 ). After Wanda and Theo observe the
values xj for Xj they update their states for B to the
posteriors ρB|Xj =xj .
Now suppose that we don’t know the details of how
Wanda and Theo arrived at their state assignments and
we are simply told that, at some speciﬁc point in time,
(1)
Wanda assigns a state σB to B and Theo assigns a state
(1)
(2)
σB (diﬀerent from σB in general). For the objective

Bayesian, this can only arise in the manner described
above, so the condition for compatibility is that it should
be possible to construct a hybrid state ρBX1 X2 over B
and two classical random variables X1 and X2 such that
(j)
σB = ρB|Xj =xj for some values xj of Xj .
Definition IV.4 (Quantum objective Bayesian compat(1)
(2)
ibility). Two quantum states σB and σB of a region
B are compatible if it is possible to construct a pair of
random variables X1 and X2 and a hybrid state ρBX1 X2
(1)
such that σB can be obtained by Bayesian conditioning
(2)
on X1 = x1 for some value x1 , and σB can be obtained
by Bayesian conditioning on X2 = x2 for some value x2 ,
i.e.
(j)

(24)

σB = ρB|Xj =xj

for some values xj of Xj . Further, we require that
ρX1 =x1 ,X2 =x2 6= 0 so that there is a possibility for both
outcomes to be obtained simultaneously.
This holds whenever the BFM compatibility condition
is satisﬁed, as the following theorem demonstrates. Recall that the support of a state ρB is the span of the
eigenvectors of ρB associated with nonzero eigenvalues.
We denote it by supp [ρB ].
(1)

(2)

Theorem IV.5. Two quantum states σB and σB of
a region B satisfy definition IV.4, i.e. they are compatible in the objective Bayesian sense, iff they share some
common support, i.e.
i
h
i
h
(2)
(1)
(25)
supp σB ∩ supp σB 6= ∅,
where ∩ indicates the geometric intersection of the subspaces.

The proof of this theorem closely resembles the proof
of its classical counterpart. First, note the quantum analogue of lemma IV.3.
Lemma IV.6.
 If a hybrid state ρXB satisﬁes ρX=x 6= 0
then supp ρB|X=x ⊆ supp [ρB ].

Proof. The condition ρX=x 6= 0 implies that ρB|X=x is
well deﬁned. Let ker [ρB ] = {|ψiB | ρB |ψiB = 0}, i.e.
ker [ρB ] is the orthogonal complement of supp [ρB ]. Let
|ψiB ∈ ker [ρB ]. Then hψ|B TrX (ρBX ) |ψiB = 0. This
implies that hψ|B ρB,X=x′ |ψiB = 0 for every x′ because each operator ρB,X=x′ is positive. Consequently,
hψ|B ρB|X=x |ψiB = 0. In other
 words, if |ψiB ∈
ker [ρB ] then |ψiB ∈ ker ρB|X=x , which means that

ker [ρB ] ⊆ ker ρB|X=x , or equivalently supp ρB|X=x ⊆
supp [ρB ].
Proof of theorem IV.5.
The “only if ” half :
It is given that there is a hybrid joint state ρBX1 X2 such
(j)
that σB = ρB|Xj =xj for some values xj of Xj . Since
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ρX1 =x1 ,X2 =x2 6= 0, the conditional state ρB|X1 =x1 ,X2 =x2
is well deﬁned. Lemma IV.6 then implies that




supp ρB|X1 =x1 ,X2 =x2 ⊆ supp ρB|X1 =x1
(26)




(27)
supp ρB|X1 =x1 ,X2 =x2 ⊆ supp ρB|X2 =x2 .
Since ρB|X1 =x1 ,X2 =x2 has nontrivial support, it follows
that




(28)
supp ρB|X1 =x1 ∩ supp ρB|X2 =x2 6= ∅.

The “if ” half :
(2)
(1)
Given that σB and σB have intersecting support, one
can ﬁnd a quantum state µB such that
(1)

(29)

(2)
p2 ) ηB ,

(30)

(2)
σB
(1)

(1)

σB = p1 µB + (1 − p1 ) ηB ,
= p2 µB + (1 −

(2)

where ηB and ηB are each quantum states and 0 <
p1 , p2 ≤ 1.
This decomposition can be used to construct two classical variables, X1 and X2 and a hybrid state ρBX1 X2
(j)
such that ρX1 =x1 ,X2 =x2 6= 0 and σB = ρB|Xj =xj for
some values x1 and x2 . Let X1 and X2 be bit-valued
variables, and deﬁne
ρB|X1 =0,X2 =0 = µB
ρB|X1 =0,X2 =1 =
ρB|X1 =1,X2 =0 =

(1)
ηB
(2)
ηB .

(31)
(32)
(33)

The result of conditioning on (X1 = 1, X2 = 1) can be
taken to be an arbitrary state, denoted νB , i.e.
ρB|X1 =1,X2 =1 = νB .

As noted in the classical case, the “if” part of the
proof only establishes suﬃciency of the BFM criterion for
causal scenarios that support generic joint states. Certain causal scenarios may enforce a restriction on the
(1)
(2)
pairs of states σB and σB that Wanda and Theo can
come to assign by conditioning on X1 and X2 . For instance, consider the causal scenarios depicted in ﬁg. 3,
where X2 is obtained by post-processing of X1 , so that
all correlations between X2 and B are mediated by X1 .
(1)
(2)
In this case, the only pairs σB and σB that can arise
by conditioning on X1 and X2 are those for which the
(1)
(2)
support of σB is contained in that of σB . We are led
to the same conclusion as we found classically: although
BFM compatibility is necessary in any causal scenario,
not every pair of BFM compatible state assignments can
arise in every causal scenario. Nonetheless, we can always
ﬁnd a causal scenario wherein there are no restrictions on
the joint state ρBX1 X2 and therefore no restriction on the
states to which a pair of agents can be led by Bayesian
conditioning. The causal scenario considered by BFM,
where X1 and X2 are the outcomes of a pair of remote
measurements on B (depicted in ﬁg. 5) is one such example, as is the causal scenario considered by Jacobs, where
X1 and X2 are the outcomes of a sequential pair of measurements and B is the output (depicted in ﬁg. 5)[60].

(34)

Next, deﬁne the following (classical) state over X1 and
X2 :
ρX1 ,X2 = p1 p2 |00i h00|X1 X2
+ (1 − p1 )p2 |01i h01|X1 X2
+ p1 (1 − p2 ) |10i h10|X1 X2
+ (1 − p2 ) (1 − p2 ) |11i h11|X1 X2 . (35)
This can be combined with the conditional states deﬁned
above to obtain
ρBX1 X2 = ρB|X1 X2 ρX1 X2

= p1 p2 µB ⊗ |00i h00|X1 X2


(1)
+ (1 − p1 )p2 ηB ⊗ |01i h01|X1 X2


(2)
+ p1 (1 − p2 ) ηB ⊗ |10i h10|X1 X2


+ (1 − p2 ) (1 − p2 ) νB ⊗ |11i h11|X1 X2 . (36)

It is then easy to verify that ρB|X1 =0 and ρB|X2 =0 are
equal to the right-hand sides of eqs. (29) and (30), and
(2)
(1)
consequently are equal to σB and σB respectively.

B.

Subjective Bayesian compatibility

A subjective Bayesian cannot use the approach just
discussed in general, since it depends on postulating a
unique prior state over B, X1 , and X2 (or Y , X1 , and
X2 in the classical case) that all agents agree upon before
collecting their data. Given that the choice of prior is an
unanalyzable matter of belief for the subjectivist, there
is no reason why Wanda and Theo need to agree on a
prior at the outset and, further, there is no reason why
the diﬀerence in their probability assignments has to be
explained by their having had access to diﬀerent data in
the ﬁrst place. If it happens that Wanda and Theo did
have a shared prior before collecting their data then the
argument runs through, but for the subjective Bayesian
this is the exception rather than the rule. In fact, since
subjective Bayesians do not rule out as irrational the possibility of agents starting out with contradictory beliefs,
it might seem that there is no role for compatibility criteria in this approach at all.
However, this is not the case since, although subjective Bayesians do not analyze how agents arrive at their
beliefs, they are interested in whether it is possible for
them to reach inter-subjective agreement in the future,
i.e. whether it is possible for them to resolve their differences by experiment or whether their disagreement is
so extreme that one of them has to make a wholesale
revision of their beliefs in order to reach agreement. In
the classical case, a subjective Bayesian will therefore
say that two probability assignments Q1 (Y ) and Q2 (Y )
to a random variable Y are compatible if it is possible
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to construct an experiment, for which Wanda and Theo
agree upon a statistical model, i.e. a likelihood function
P (X|Y ), such that at least one outcome X = x of the
experiment would cause Wanda and Theo to assign identical probabilities when they update their probabilities
by Bayesian conditioning. In other words, the subjective
Bayesian account of compatibility is in terms of the possibility of future agreement, in contrast to the objective
Bayesian account, which relies on a guarantee of agreement in the past [61]

tributions to

Definition IV.7 (Classical subjective Bayesian compatibility). Two probability distributions, Q1 (Y ) and Q2 (Y ),
are compatible if it is possible to construct a random
variable X and a conditional probability distribution
P (X|Y ) (often called a likelihood function in this context) such that there exists a value x of X for which
P
Y P (X = x|Y )Qj (Y ) 6= 0 and

In the quantum case, if Wanda and Theo assign states
to a quantum region then they are compatible if
there is some classical data X that they can collect about
the system, for which Wanda and Theo agree upon a
statistical model, such that observing at least one value
x of X would cause their state assignments to become
identical.

P1 (Y |X = x) = P2 (Y |X = x)

where Pj (Y |X) ≡ P (X|Y ) Qj (Y )/

P

Y

(37)

P (X|Y ) Qj (Y ).

It turns out that the mathematical criteria that Q1 (Y )
and Q2 (Y ) must satisfy in order to be compatible in this
subjective Bayesian sense are precisely the same as those
required for objective Bayesian compatibility.
Theorem IV.8. Two probability distributions Q1 (Y )
and Q2 (Y ) satisfy definition IV.7, i.e. they are compatible in the subjective Bayesian sense, iff they share some
common support, i.e.
supp [Q1 (Y )] ∩ supp [Q2 (Y )] 6= ∅.

(38)

Proof.
The “only if ” half :
Since Pj (Y |X = x) is derived from Qj (Y ) by Bayesian
conditioning, it follows from lemma IV.3 that
supp [P1 (Y |X = x)] ⊆ supp [Q1 (Y )]
supp [P2 (Y |X = x)] ⊆ supp [Q2 (Y )] .

(39)
(40)

However, by assumption, P1 (Y |X = x) = P2 (Y |X = x),
so the left-hand sides of eqs. (39) and (40) are equal.
It follows that Q1 (Y ) and Q2 (Y ) have some common
support, namely, supp [P1 (S|X = x)].
The “if ” half :
By assumption, there is at least one value y of Y belonging to the common support of Q1 (Y ) and Q2 (Y ). Let
X be a classical bit and deﬁne the likelihood function
P (X = 0|Y = y) = 1
P (X = 0|Y 6= y) = 0

P (X = 1|Y = y) = 0
P (X = 1|Y 6= y) = 1.

(41)
(42)

If Wanda and Theo agree to use this likelihood function,
then, upon observing X = 0, they will update their dis-

Pj (Y = y ′ |X = 0) =
P (X = 0|Y = y ′ )Qj (Y = y ′ )
P
′
′
y ′ P (X = 0|Y = y )Qj (Y = y )

= δy,y′ ,

(43)

which is independent of j and hence brings them into
agreement.
(j)
σS

Definition IV.9 (Quantum subjective Bayesian com(2)
(1)
patibility). Two states σB and σB are compatible if
it is possible to construct a random variable X and a
conditional state ρX|B (which we call a likelihood operator) such that there
exists a value x of X for which

(j)

TrB ρX=x|B σB

6= 0 and

(2)

(1)

(44)

ρB|X=x = ρB|X=x
(j)

where ρB|X=x is given by the quantum Bayes’ theorem:




(j)
(j)
(j)
ρB|X=x ≡ ρX=x|B ⋆ σB /TrB ρX=x|B σB .
Once again, subjective Bayesian compatibility has the
same mathematical consequences as its objective counterpart. Both are equivalent to requiring the BFM criterion.
(1)

(2)

Theorem IV.10. Two states σB and σB satisfy definition IV.9, i.e. they are compatible in the subjective
Bayesian sense, iff they share common support, i.e.
i
i
h
h
(2)
(1)
(45)
supp σB ∩ supp σB 6= ∅,
where ∩ denotes the geometric intersection.
Proof.
The “only if ” half :
(j)
(j)
Since ρB|X=x is derived from σB by Bayesian conditioning, it follows from lemma IV.6 that
i
h
i
h
(1)
(1)
(46)
supp ρB|X=x ⊆ supp σB
i
i
h
h
(2)
(2)
(47)
supp ρB|X=x ⊆ supp σB .
(1)

(2)

However, by assumption, ρB|X=x = ρB|X=x , so the lefthand sides of eqs. (46) and (47) are equal. It follows
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(2)

(1)

that σ
h B and iσB have some common support, namely,
(1)
supp ρB|X=x .
The “if ” half :
(2)
(1)
By assumption, the supports of σB and σB have nontrivial intersection. It follows that there is a pure state
|ψiB ∈ HB in the common support. Let X be a classical
bit and deﬁne the likelihood operator
ρX|B =
|0i h0|X ⊗ |ψi hψ|B + |1i h1|X ⊗ (IB − |ψi hψ|B ) . (48)
If Wanda and Theo agree to use this likelihood operator,
then, upon observing X = 0 they will update their states
to
(j)

(j)
ρB|X=0

ρX=0|B ⋆ σB
 = |ψi hψ|B ,

=
(j)
TrB ρX=0|B σB

(49)

which is independent of j and hence brings them into
agreement.

C.

Comparison to other approaches
1.

Brun, Finkelstein and Mermin

The original BFM argument [24], which is objective
Bayesian in ﬂavor, is divided into arguments for the necessity and suﬃciency of their criterion. To establish
suﬃciency, they show that for any pair of state assignments that satisfy their criterion, one can ﬁnd a triple
of distinct systems, and a quantum state thereon, such
that if Wanda measures one system and Theo another,
then for some pair of outcomes Wanda and Theo are led
to update their description of the third system to the
given pair of state assignments. This is equivalent to the
“if” part of our theorem IV.5 when applied to the remote
measurement scenario depicted in ﬁg. 5. The argument
provided by BFM for the necessity of their criterion is
based on a set of reasonable-sounding requirements. For
example, their ﬁrst requirement is:
If anybody describes a system with a density
matrix ρ, then nobody can ﬁnd it to be in a
pure state in the null space of ρ. For although
anyone can get a measurement outcome that
everyone has assigned nonzero probabilities,
nobody can get an outcome that anybody
knows to be impossible.
If one is adopting an approach wherein quantum states
describe the information, knowledge, or beliefs of agents,
then the notion of ﬁnding a system “to be in a pure
state” is inappropriate, as emphasized by Caves, Fuchs
and Schack [29]. However, even glossing over this, their
argument does not satisfy an ideal to which a proper objective Bayesian account of compatibility should strive,

namely, of being justiﬁed by a general methodology for
Bayesian inference. This ideal is illustrated by the derivation of the objective Bayesian criterion of classical compatibility presented in §IV A: if a pair of agents obey
the strictures of objective Bayesianism, i.e. assigning the
same ignorance priors and updating their probabilities
via Bayesian conditioning, then they will never encounter
a situation in which the compatibility condition does not
hold, and conversely if the compatibility condition holds,
it is always possible for them to come to their state assignments by Bayesian updating.
Because we have proposed a methodology for quantum
Bayesian inference, we can achieve this ideal in the quantum case as well. Indeed, the close parallel between the
proofs of the classical and quantum compatibility theorems demonstrates that one can achieve the ideal in
the quantum context to precisely the same extent that it
can be achieved in the classical context. Whilst our argument for suﬃciency of the BFM criterion (the second
part of our proof of theorem IV.5) is mathematically similar to BFM’s argument for suﬃciency, it is only against
the background of our framework of quantum conditional
states that it becomes possible to identify the update rule
used by Wanda and Theo as an instance of Bayesian conditioning, and thus a special case of a general methodology for Bayesian inference.
A second point to note is that in our argument for the
compatibility condition, we consider a triple of spacetime regions that do not necessarily correspond to three
distinct systems at a given time — the case considered
by BFM. The causal relation between them might instead be any of those depicted in ﬁgs. 3–7, or indeed any
scenario wherein all the available information about the
quantum region can be captured by assigning a single
quantum state. Thus, our results generalize the range
of applicability of the BFM compatibility criterion to a
broader set of causal scenarios.

2.

Jacobs

Jacobs [28] has also considered the compatibility of
state assignments using an approach that is objective
Bayesian in ﬂavor. In his analysis, the region of interest
is the output of a sequence of measurements made one
after the other on the same system, and Wanda and Theo
have information about the outcomes of distinct subsets
of those measurements. A simple version of this scenario
is where there is a sequence of two measurements, where
the outcome of the ﬁrst measurement is known to Wanda
and the outcome of the second is known to Theo. This is
just the causal scenario depicted in ﬁg. 7, and as emphasized there, such a scenario falls within the scope of our
approach. In the objective Bayesian framework, Wanda
and Theo agree on the input state to the pair of measurements and they agree on the quantum instruments that
describe each measurement. Jacobs shows that if Wanda
and Theo’s state assignments are obtained in this way,
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then they must satisfy the BFM compatibility criterion,
that is, he provides an argument for the necessity of the
BFM compatibility criterion in this causal context.
If Wanda and Theo come to their state assignments for
B using Jacobs’ scheme, then, as explained in §III B, their
prior knowledge of B and the two outcome variables, X1
and X2 , can be described by a joint state ρBX1 X2 . After observing values x1 and x2 respectively, they come to
assign states ρB|X1 =x1 and ρB|X2 =x2 , which are derived
from the conditional states of the joint state ρBX1 X2 .
Such a pair of states satisﬁes the deﬁnition IV.4 of quantum objective Bayesian compatibility. Theorem IV.5
then implies that their state assignments satisfy the BFM
compatibility criterion. Conversely, because the set of
joint states ρBX1 X2 which can arise in this causal scenario
is unrestricted (see footnote [60]), it also follows from
theorem IV.5 that for any pair of state assignments satisfying the BFM criterion, Wanda and Theo could come
to assign those states in this causal scenario. These results can be generalized to the case of a longer sequence
of measurements with the outcomes distributed arbitrarily among a number of parties, which covers the most
general case considered by Jacobs.
To summarize, our results can be applied to Jacobs’
scenario and we recover Jacobs’ result that the BFM criterion is a necessary requirement. Furthermore, we have
improved upon Jacobs’ analysis in two ways. Firstly,
we have shown that the BFM compatibility criterion is
not only a necessary condition for compatibility in this
scenario, but is sufficient as well. Secondly, our analysis demonstrates that, just as with the scenario of remote measurements, the BFM criterion can be justiﬁed
in the scenario of sequential measurements by insisting
that states should be updated by Bayesian conditioning
within a general framework for quantum Bayesian inference.

3.

Caves, Fuchs and Schack

In contrast to BFM and Jacobs, CFS [29] discuss the
problem of quantum state compatibility from an explicitly subjective Bayesian point of view. They argue that
there cannot be a unilateral requirement to impose compatibility criteria of any sort on subjective Bayesian degrees of belief because there is no unique prior quantum
state that an agent ought to assign in light of a given
collection of data. The only necessary constraint is that
states should satisfy the axioms of quantum theory, i.e.
they should be normalized density operators. In particular, it should not be viewed as irrational for two agents
to assign distinct, or even orthogonal, pure states to a
quantum system.
Whilst we agree with this argument, we think that
there is still a role for compatibility criteria within the
subjective approach. They can be viewed as a check to
see whether it is worthwhile for the agents to engage in
a particular inference procedure, and this is conceptually

distinct from viewing them as unilateral requirements
that must be imposed upon all state assignments. In
the case of BFM compatibility, the criterion of intersecting supports is simply a check that agents can apply to
see if it is worth their while to try and resolve their differences empirically by collecting more data, or whether
their disagreement is so extreme that resolving it requires
one or more of the agents to make a wholesale revision
of their beliefs. From this point of view, BFM plays the
same role as the criterion of overlapping supports does in
classical subjective Bayesian probability.
Despite their skepticism of compatibility criteria, CFS
do attempt to recast the necessity part of the BFM argument in terms that would be more acceptable to the
subjective Bayesian, i.e. they outline a series of requirements that a pair of subjective Bayesian agents may wish
to adopt that would lead them to assign BFM compatible states. They do not provide an argument for suﬃciency, so this is one way in which our argument is more
complete. CFS’s argument is quite similar to the BFM
necessity argument, except that it is phrased in terms
that would be more acceptable to a subjective Bayesian.
For example, they talk about the “ﬁrm beliefs” of agents
rather than saying that systems are “found to be” in certain pure states. However, this line of argument is still
open to an objection that we leveled against the BFM
argument. In our view, compatibility criteria should be
derived from the inference methodologies that are being
used by the agents rather than from a list of reasonable sounding requirements. Another objection is that
their argument relies on strong Dutch Book coherence,
which is a strengthening of the usual Dutch Book coherence that subjective Bayesians use to derive the structure
of classical probability theory. Strong coherence entails
that if an agent assigns probability one to an event then
she must be certain that it will occur. This is obviously
problematic in the case of inﬁnite sample spaces due to
the presence of sets of measure zero and, since there is
nothing in the Dutch Book argument that singles out ﬁnite sample spaces, it would not usually be accepted by
subjective Bayesians in that case either.
Since CFS do not believe that the BFM criterion is
a uniquely compelling requirement, they also introduce
a number of weaker compatibility criteria based on the
compatibility of the probability distributions obtained by
making diﬀerent types of measurement on the system.
Three of these compatibility criteria are equivalent to the
usual intersecting support criterion in the classical case,
but they become inequivalent when applied to quantum
theory. Presumably, this is supposed to cast doubt upon
the uniqueness of BFM as a compelling compatibility criterion in the quantum case. However, in our view, the
non-BFM criteria in the CFS hierarchy are not meaningful as compatibility criteria. To explain why, we take
their weakest criterion — W ′ compatibility — as an example.
The W ′ criterion says that two quantum states are
compatible if there exists a measurement for which the
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Born rule outcome probability distributions computed
from the two states are compatible in the classical sense,
i.e. they have intersecting support in the set of outcomes.
It is fairly easy to see that this places no constraint at all
on state assignments — such a measurement can always
be found. For example, if Wanda and Theo assign two
orthogonal pure states then a measurement in a complementary basis would always yield compatible probability
distributions over the set of outcomes. CFS argue that
Wanda and Theo could resolve their diﬀerences empirically by making such a measurement in this scenario.
After the measurement, if both Wanda and Theo learn
the outcome and apply the projection postulate, then
they would end up assigning the same state to the system, speciﬁcally, the state in the complementary basis
corresponding to the outcome that was observed.
However, in our view, this does not resolve the original conﬂict between Wanda and Theo. Although Wanda
and Theo’s state assignments to the region after the measurement (its quantum output) are now identical, their
state assignments to the region before the measurement
(its quantum input) remain unchanged. As stated in
§III A, and explained in more detail in [1], the state of
the region before the measurement updates via quantum
Bayesian conditioning rather than by the projection postulate. Pure states are ﬁxed points of quantum Bayesian
conditioning, so Wanda and Theo will always continue
to disagree about the state of this region, whatever information they later acquire about the region.
The mistake that CFS have made is to think of compatibility in terms of persistent systems rather than spatiotemporal regions, and to think of the projection postulate as a quantum analogue of Bayesian conditioning. It
is easy to make this mistake because in a classical theory of Bayesian inference, a measurement can be nondisturbing. In this case, the value of the variable Y being measured is not changed by the measurement, and
the update rule for the probability distribution of Y can
be understood as conditioning Y on the outcome of the
measurement. The variable describing the system before the measurement is the same as the one describing
it after, so that updating your beliefs about one is the
same as updating your beliefs about the other. But this
is no longer true for classical measurements that disturb
the system, and as argued in [1], all nontrivial quantum
measurements are analogous to these. Therefore, to highlight the problem with the W ′ compatibility criterion, we
consider what it would predict in the case of a disturbing
classical measurement.
Suppose the system is a coin that has just been ﬂipped,
but is currently hidden from Wanda and Theo. If Wanda
believes that the coin has deﬁnitely landed heads and
Theo believes that it has deﬁnitely landed tails, then
their beliefs are certainly incompatible. If the coin is
then ﬂipped again and Wanda and Theo are shown the
outcome of the second toss, they will agree on the current state of the coin, and hence their state assignments
to the system after the observation are now compatible.

However, because the conﬁguration of the coin was disturbed in the process of measurement, there is no sense in
which their disagreement about the outcome of the ﬁrst
coin ﬂip has been resolved. Similarly, we believe that
because nontrivial quantum measurements always entail
a disturbance (in the sense described in [1]), coming to
agreement about the state of the region after the measurement does not resolve a disagreement about the state
of the region before the measurement.
Despite our reservations about the CFS compatibility
criteria, they are still of some independent interest. In
particular, one of them (the PP criterion) was recently
used in a quite diﬀerent context as part of a no-go theorem for certain types of hidden variable models for quantum theory [46].
V. INTERMEZZO: CONDITIONAL
INDEPENDENCE AND SUFFICIENCY

Having dealt with state compatibility, our next task
is to develop a Bayesian approach to combining state
assignments. In order to do this, two additional concepts are needed: conditional independence and suﬃcient
statistics, which are reviewed in this section. Quantum
conditional independence has been studied in [40], from
which we quote results without proof.
A.
1.

Conditional independence

Classical conditional independence

A pair of random variables R and S are conditionally
independent given another random variable T if they satisfy any of the following equivalent conditions:
CI1: P (S|R, T ) = P (S|T )
CI2: P (R|S, T ) = P (R|T )
CI3: I(R : S|T ) = 0
CI4: P (R, S|T ) = P (R|T )P (S|T ),
where it is left implicit that these equations only have
to hold for those values of the variables for which the
conditionals are well-deﬁned. Here, I(R : S|T ) is the
conditional mutual information of R and S given T , deﬁned by
I(R : S|T ) = H(R, T ) + H(S, T )
− H(T ) − H(R, S, T ), (50)
P
where H(R) = − r P (R = r) log2 P (R = r) is the
Shannon entropy of R, with the obvious generalization
to multiple variables. Note that the conditional mutual
information is always positive.
Conditional independence of R and S given T means
that any correlations between R and S are mediated, or
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screened-oﬀ, by T . In other words, if one were to learn
the value of T then R and S would become independent.
2.

Quantum conditional independence for acausally related
regions

In the quantum case, the three random variables R, S
and T become quantum regions with Hilbert spaces HA ,
HB and HC . We specialize to the case of three acausally
related regions because the theory of conditional independence has not yet been developed for other causal scenarios. Prior to the introduction of conditional states, it was
not obvious whether the conditional independence conditions CI1, CI2 and CI4 had quantum analogs, but CI3
has a straightforward generalization where I(A : B|C) is
now the quantum conditional mutual information deﬁned
as
I(A : B|C) = S(A, C) + S(B, C)
− S(C) − S(A, B, C),

(51)

where S(A) = −TrA (ρA log ρA ) is the von Neumann
entropy of the state on A. The quantum conditional
mutual information satisﬁes I(A : B|C) ≥ 0, which is
equivalent to the strong sub-additivity inequality [47],
and so the quantum conditional independence condition
I(A : B|C) = 0 is the equality condition for strong subadditivity.
In the conditional states formalism, there are direct
analogs of the conditions CI1 and CI2 that provide an
alternative characterization of quantum conditional independence.
Theorem V.1. For three acausally related regions, A,
B and C, the following conditions are equivalent:
QCI1: ρA|BC = ρA|C
QCI2: ρB|AC = ρB|C
QCI3: I(A : B|C) = 0

3.

Hybrid conditional independence

The case that is most relevant to the present work is
when two classical random variables X1 and X2 are conditionally independent given a quantum region B. The
proofs of theorems V.1 and V.2 only depend on the existence of a joint state (positive, normalized, density operator) for the three regions under consideration. Therefore,
if we specialize to causal scenarios in which a joint state
ρBX1 X2 can be assigned, as discussed in §III B, then the
deﬁnitions QCI1–QCI3 can now be applied in any of
these causal scenarios by substituting X1 for A, X2 for
B and B for C. The consequence QCI4 also applies to
this case.
B.

Sufficient statistics

The idea of a suﬃcient statistic can be motivated by a
typical example problem in statistics: estimating the bias
of a coin from a sequence of coin ﬂips that are judged to
be independent and identically distributed. In this problem, only the relative frequency of occurrence of heads
and tails in the sequence is relevant to the bias, whilst the
exact ordering of heads and tails is irrelevant. The relative frequency is then an example of a suﬃcient statistic
for the sequence with respect to the bias. In this section,
this notion is generalized to the hybrid case wherein the
classical parameter to be estimated is replaced by a quantum region, but the data is still classical, i.e. this section
concerns suﬃcient statistics for classical data with respect to a quantum region. Note that quantum suﬃcient
statistics have been considered before in the literature
[41–43], but these works are somewhat orthogonal to the
present treatment because they concern suﬃciency of a
quantum system with respect to classical measurement
data [42, 43], or the suﬃciency of measurement data with
respect to preparation data [41].
1.

Classical sufficient statistics

Due to these equivalences, any of QCI1–QCI3 can be
viewed as the deﬁnition of quantum conditional independence.
It is also true that

Suppose a parameter, represented by a random variable Y , is to be estimated from data, represented by a
random variable X.

Theorem V.2. If A is conditionally independent of B
given C, then

Definition V.3. A sufficient statistic for X with respect
to Y is a function t of the values of X such that the
random variable t(X) satisﬁes

QCI4: ρAB|C = ρA|C ρB|C .
Because ρAB|C is self-adjoint, theorem V.2 implies that
ρA|C and ρB|C must commute when A and B are conditionally independent given C. Unlike in the classical
case, the converse of theorem V.2 does not hold, i.e.
ρAB|C = ρA|C ρB|C does not imply conditional independence. Extra constraints on the form of ρC can be imposed to yield equivalence, but these are not important
for present purposes (see [40] for details).

P (Y |t(X) = t(x)) = P (Y |X = x),

(52)

for all x such that P (X = x) 6= 0.
A suﬃcient statistic for X is a way of processing X
such that the result is just as informative about Y as X
is. In other words, learning the value of the processed
variable t(X) allows an agent to make all the same inferences about Y that they could have made by learning the
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value of X itself. Such processings are coarse-grainings
of the values of X, which discard information about X,
but only information that is not relevant for making inferences about Y .
Since t(X) is just a function of X, it is immediate that
Y is conditionally independent of t(X) given X, i.e.
P (Y |X, t(X)) = P (Y |X),

(53)

This follows from the fact that we can write the joint distribution as P (Y, X, t(X)) = P (t(X)|X)P (Y X) (where
P (t(X) = a|X = x) = δa,t(x) ). Moreover, the suﬃciency
condition, eq. (52), implies that it is also true that Y is
conditionally independent of X given t(X), i.e.
P (Y |X, t(X)) = P (Y |t(X)).

(54)

This is a consequence of the fact that the joint distribution can also be written as P (Y, X, t(X)) =
P (t(X)|X)P (Y |t(X))P (X), where we have used eq. (52).
Definition V.4. A minimal suﬃcient statistic for X
with respect to Y is a suﬃcient statistic that can be written as a function of any other suﬃcient statistic for X
with respect to Y .
A minimal suﬃcient statistic for X with respect to
Y contains only that information about X that is relevant for making inferences about Y . Clearly, a suﬃcient
statistic t is minimal iﬀ
t(x) = t(x′ ) ⇔ P (Y |X = x) = P (Y |X = x′ ).

(55)

The following lemma is used repeatedly in our discussion of combining quantum states.
Lemma V.5. Let P (X, Y ) be a probability distribution
over two random variables and let t(x) = P (Y |X = x),
i.e. t is a statistic for X that takes functions of Y for
its values. Then, t is a minimal suﬃcient statistic for X
with respect to Y and
P (Y |t(X) = t(x)) = t(x).

(56)

Proof. Clearly t satisﬁes eq. (55) because t(x) is equal to
P (Y |X = x) in this case. It is therefore minimally suﬃcient. By the conditional version of belief propagation
P (Y |t(X) = t(x)) =
X
P (Y |X = x′ , t(X) = t(x))P (X = x′ |t(X) = t(x)).
x′

(57)

Since t is a suﬃcient statistic, A is conditionally independent of t(X) given X, so this reduces to
P (Y |t(X) = t(x)) =
X
P (Y |X = x′ )P (X = x′ |t(X) = t(x)).
x′

(58)

The term P (X = x′ |t(X) = t(x)) is only nonzero for
those values x′ such that t(x′ ) = t(x) and all such values
satisfy P (Y |X = x′ ) = P (Y |X = x). Therefore,
P (Y |t(X) = t(x)) =
X
P (Y |X = x)

P (X = x′ |t(X) = t(x)).

(59)

{x′ |t(x′ )=t(x)}

P
′
However,
{x′ |t(x′ )=t(x)} P (X = x |t(X) = t(x)) =
P
′
′
x′ P (X = x |t(X) = t(x)) = 1, since P (X = x |t(X) =
′
t(x)) is zero when t(x ) 6= t(x) and it is a conditional
probability distribution. Hence,
P (Y |t(X) = t(x)) = P (Y |X = x)
= t(x).

(60)
(61)

Eq. (56) looks superﬁcially similar to Lewis’ Principal
Principle [48], which states that when you know that the
objective chance of an event takes a particular value then
you should assign that value as your subjective probability for that event. However, eq. (56) is not a statement
about objective chances. Its interpretation is entirely in
terms of subjective probabilities. Suppose P (X, Y ) is
your subjective probability distribution for X and Y and
you announce this to me. I then go and observe X, ﬁnding that it has the value x. If I then tell you that the
subjective probability distribution that you would assign
to Y if you knew the value of X that I have observed is
Q(Y ), and you believe that I am being honest, i.e. that I
have computed Q(Y ) = P (Y |X = x) from your subjective probability distribution and this is what I am reporting back to you, then you have learned that t(X) = Q
and eq. (56) says that your posterior probability distribution for Y should now be Q(Y ).
2.

Hybrid sufficient statistics

Recall that if XB is a hybrid region then conditional
density operators ρB|X are of the form
X
ρB|X =
|xi hx|X ⊗ ρB|X=x ,
(62)
x

where the operators ρB|X=x are normalized density operators on HB . As in the classical case, the idea of suﬃciency is to ﬁnd a statistic for X with fewer values than
X that still allows the conditional density operator to be
reconstructed. In order to do this, it is only necessary
to know which density operator ρB|X=x a value of X
corresponds to, and there may be fewer distinct density
operators than values of X. This motivates the following
deﬁnition.
Definition V.6. A sufficient statistic for X with respect
to the quantum region B is a function t of the values of
X such that the random variable t(X) satisﬁes
ρB|t(X)=t(x) = ρB|X=x ,

(63)
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for all x such that ρX=x 6= 0.
This deﬁnition captures the notion that learning the
value of the processed variable t(X) allows an agent to
make all the same inferences about the quantum region
B that they could have made by learning the value of X
itself.
Since t(X) is just a classical processing of X (specifically, ρt(X)=a|X=x = δa,t(x) ), we can introduce a joint
state on the composite system BXt(X) as discussed in
§III B via
ρBXt(X) = ρt(X)|X ρBX ,

(64)

As one can easily verify, this state satisﬁes the analogous
conditional independence relations to those that hold in
the classical case. Speciﬁcally, B and t(X) are conditionally independent given X,
ρB|Xt(X) = ρB|X ,

(65)

and because t(X) is a suﬃcient statistic for X with respect to B, it is also the case that B and X are conditionally independent given t(X),
ρB|Xt(X) = ρB|t(X) ,

(66)

as can be seen by noting that the joint state can also be
written as ρBXt(X) = ρt(X)|X ρB|t(X) ρX if one makes use
of eq. (63).
Definition V.7. A minimal suﬃcient statistic for X
with respect to a quantum region B is a suﬃcient statistic
that can be written as a function of any other suﬃcient
statistic for X with respect to a quantum region B.
It follows that minimal suﬃciency is equivalent to
t(x) = t(x′ ) ⇔ ρB|X=x = ρB|X=x′ .

(67)

We will also need an analog of lemma V.5.
Lemma V.8. Let ρXB be the state of a hybrid region
XB and let t(x) = ρB|X=x , i.e. t is a statistic for X that
takes quantum states on B for its values. Then, t is a
minimal suﬃcient statistic for X with respect to B and
ρB|t(X)=t(x) = t(x).

(68)

Proof. The statistic t satisﬁes eq. (67) because t(x) is
equal to ρB|X=x . It is therefore minimally suﬃcient. By
the conditional version of belief propagation

(69)
ρB|t(X)=t(x) = TrX ρB|Xt(X)=x ρX|t(X)=t(x) .

Since t is a suﬃcient statistic, B is conditionally independent of t(X) given X, so this reduces to

(70)
ρB|t(X)=t(x) = TrX ρB|X ρX|t(X)=t(x) .

However, ρX=x′ |t(X)=t(x) is only nonzero for those values x′ such that t(x′ ) = t(x) and all such values satisfy
ρB|X=x′ = ρB|X=x . Therefore,
ρB|t(X)=t(x) =
ρB|X=x

X

{x′ |t(x′ )=t(x)}

ρX=x′ |t(X)=t(x) . (71)

P
′
ρ
=
However,
′
′
{x |t(x )=t(x)} X=x |t(X)=t(x)
TrX ρX|t(X)=t(x) = 1, since ρX=x′ |t(X)=t(x) is zero
when t(x′ ) 6= t(x) and ρX|t(X) is a conditional state.
Hence,
ρB|t(X)=t(x) = ρB|X=x
= t(x).

VI.

(72)
(73)

QUANTUM STATE IMPROVEMENT

State improvement is the task of updating your state
assignment in the light of learning another agent’s state
assignment. It is the simplest example of a procedure
for combining diﬀerent states. We adopt the approach
of treating the other agent’s state assignment as data
and conditioning on it. In the classical case, this idea is
usually attributed to Morris [49].

A.

General methodology for state improvement

Classically, suppose a decision maker, Debbie, assigns
a prior state P0 (Y ) to the variable of interest, Y . Debbie
may have little or no specialist knowledge about Y , in
which case her prior would be something like a uniform
distribution. In order to improve the quality of her decision, she consults an expert, Wanda, who reports her
opinion in the form of a state Q1 (Y ). Assuming that
Debbie does not have the expertise to assess the data
and arguments by which Wanda arrived at her state assignment, the summary Q1 (Y ) is all she has to go on.
In order to improve her state assignment by Bayesian
conditioning, Debbie has to treat Wanda’s state assignment as data. This means that she has to construct a
likelihood function P0 (R|Y ), where R is a random variable that ranges over all the possible state assignments
that Wanda might report. Since R ranges over a space
of functions, there may be technical diﬃculties in deﬁning a sample space for it, but in practice R can usually
be conﬁned to well parameterized families of states, e.g.
Gaussian states or a ﬁnite set of choices. In assigning
her likelihood function, Debbie has to take into account
factors such as Wanda’s trustworthiness, her accuracy
in making previous predictions, and so forth. Assuming
that Debbie can do this, she can then update her prior
state via Bayes’ theorem to obtain
P0 (Y |R = Q1 ) =

P0 (R = Q1 |Y )P0 (Y )
.
P0 (R = Q1 )

(74)

P
where P0 (R = Q1 ) = Y P0 (R = Q1 |Y )P0 (Y ).
Turning to the quantum case, the situation is precisely
the same except that we are now dealing with hybrid
regions and the quantum Bayes’ theorem. Speciﬁcally,
Debbie is now interested in a quantum region B, to which
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(0)

she assigns a prior state ρB , and Wanda announces her
(1)
expert state assignment σB . Debbie treats Wanda’s announcement as data and constructs a classical random
variable R that takes Wanda’s possible state assignments
as values. Constructing a sample space for all possible states is again technically subtle, but in practice attention can be restricted to well-parameterized families.
(0)
Debbie’s likelihood is now a hybrid conditional state ρR|B
and she updates her prior state assignment via the hybrid
Bayes’ theorem to give
 !

ρ

(0)

(1)

B|R=σB

where ρ

=ρ

(0)
(1)

R=σB

(0)

(1)

R=σB |B

(0)

⋆


(0)
= TrB ρ

ρB

ρ

(0)
ρ
(1)
R=σ |B B
B

−1

(0)

(1)

R=σB

.

(75)


.

Note that the same methodology can be applied when
Debbie consults more than one expert: Wanda, Theo,
etc. Debbie simply has to construct a likelihood function P (R1 , R2 , . . . |Y ) in the classical case or a likelihood
operator ρR1 R2 ,...|B in the quantum case, where R1 represents Wanda’s state assignment, R2 represents Theo’s
state assignment, etc. She then applies the appropriate
version of Bayes’ theorem to condition on the state assignments that the experts announce. This procedure is
used in our approach to the pooling problem, discussed
in §VII.

B.

The case of shared priors

Eqs. (74) and (75) are the general rules that Debbie
should use to improve her state assignment, but in practice it can be diﬃcult to determine the likelihoods for
R needed to apply them. However, the rules can simplify drastically in some situations. In particular, if Debbie and Wanda started with a shared prior for Y or B,
Wanda’s state diﬀers from Debbie’s due to having collected more data, and Debbie is willing to trust Wanda’s
data analysis, then the rules imply that Debbie should
just adopt Wanda’s state assignment wholesale.
Note that, in both the objective and subjective approaches, starting out with shared priors is an idealization. In the objective approach this is because it is
unlikely that Debbie and Wanda have exactly the same
knowledge about the region of interest, and in the subjective approach this is because their prior beliefs might
simply be diﬀerent. Nevertheless, in the objective approach we can always imagine a (possibly hypothetical)
time in the past at which Debbie and Wanda had exactly
the same knowledge and, provided Debbie’s knowledge is
a subset of Wanda’s current knowledge, the result still
follows. This argument does not apply in the subjective
case, but there are still circumstances in which the ideal
of shared priors is a good approximation.
Consider ﬁrst the classical case. Debbie and Wanda
share a prior state assignment P0 (Y ) = P1 (Y ) = P (Y )

for the variable of interest. Wanda then obtains some
extra data in the form of the value x of some random
variable X that is correlated with Y . Before learning the
value of X, Wanda adopts a likelihood model for it, given
by conditional probabilities P (X|Y ), and we assume that
Debbie agrees with this likelihood model. Upon acquiring the value x of X, Wanda updates her probabilities
to Q1 (Y ) = P (Y |X = x), which can be computed from
Bayes’ theorem, and then she reports Q1 (Y ) to Debbie.
In other words, Debbie learns that R = Q1 and she must
condition on this data to obtain her improved state assignment P (Y |R = Q1 ).
Proposition VI.1. If Debbie and Wanda share a prior
state assignment P (Y ) and likelihood model P (X|Y ) for
the data collected by Wanda, then Debbie’s improved
state is P (Y |R = Q1 ) = Q1 (Y ), where Q1 (Y ) is Wanda’s
updated state assignment.
Proof. Because Debbie and Wanda have a shared prior
and likelihood assignment, the variable R is simply
R(x) = P (Y |X = x), where P (Y |X = x) is the probability distribution that Debbie would assign if she knew
the value of X. Lemma V.5 then implies that P (Y |R =
Q1 ) = Q1 .
Note that Aumann [50] has argued that there is a
unique posterior that objective Bayesians ought to assign when their state assignments are common knowledge. The above theorem is a special case of this in which
the unique state can be easily computed.
In the quantum case, the argument proceeds in precise
analogy. Debbie and Wanda start with a shared prior
state ρB for region B. Wanda announces her state as(1)
signment σB , which can be represented as the result of
conditioning B on the value x of a random variable X,
(1)
i.e. σB = ρB|X=x . We assume that Debbie and Wanda
agree upon the likelihood operator ρX|B for X. Debbie
then has to compute her improved state ρB|R=σ(1) .
B

Proposition VI.2. If Debbie and Wanda share a prior
state assignment ρB and likelihood operator ρX|B for the
data collected by Wanda, then Debbie’s improved state is
(1)
(1)
ρB|R=σ(1) = σB , where σB is Wanda’s updated state
B
assignment.
The proof is just the obvious generalization of the proof
of theorem VI.1, making use of lemma V.8 instead of
lemma V.5.
C.

Discussion

Although our results show that state improvement is
trivial in the case of shared priors, eqs. (74) and (75)
are still applicable when Debbie and Wanda do not share
prior states and, in that case, they give nontrivial results.
The analysis of such cases is a lot more involved, so we
do not consider any examples here.
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In the classical case, the general methodology leading
to eq. (74) can be criticized. It is an onerous requirement for Debbie to be able to articulate a likelihood for
all possible state assignments that Wanda might make.
This criticism is mitigated by the shared priors result,
which shows that, at least in this case, the likelihood
model need not be speciﬁed in detail. Such simpliﬁcations might also occur in other models that do not depend on shared priors. In any case, this criticism is not
particularly unique to state improvement, since it can
be leveled at Bayesian methodology in general. It is always a heavy requirement for an agent to specify a full
probability distribution over all the variables of interest.
For this reason, alternative Bayesian theories have been
developed with less onerous requirements, such as the requirement to specify expectation values rather than full
probability distributions [19, 20, 51].
A criticism that is more speciﬁc to state improvement
is that the beliefs that Debbie uses to determine P0 (Y )
might be correlated with the beliefs that she uses to determine the likelihood P0 (R|Y ), e.g. Debbie might be
biased towards believing that Wanda will report states
that are concentrated on values of Y that Debbie herself believes are likely. A generalization that takes these
correlations into account has been proposed [52].
Every criticism leveled against the classical methodology also applies to the quantum case and, no doubt, the
proposed classical generalizations could be raised to the
quantum level by applying the methods outlined in this
paper. This is not done here because it is not our goal to
say the ﬁnal word on quantum state improvement, but
only to point out that there is no need to reinvent the
wheel when studying the quantum case because classical
methods can be easily adapted using the formalism of
conditional states.
Finally, note that quantum state improvement has previously been considered by Herbut [34], who adopted
an ad hoc procedure based on closeness of Debbie and
Wanda’s states with respect to Hilbert-Schmidt distance.
It would be interesting to see if Herbut’s rule can be
derived using Bayesian methodology under a set of reasonable assumptions that Debbie could make about how
Wanda arrived at her state assignment.

VII.

QUANTUM STATE POOLING

The problem of state pooling concerns what happens
when agents who each have their own state assignments
want to make decisions as a group. To do so, they need to
come up with a state assignment that accurately reﬂects
the views of the group as a whole.
In an ideal world, the agents would ﬁrst reconcile
their diﬀerences empirically so that everyone agrees on a
common state assignment. The discussion of subjective
Bayesian compatibility shows that it is possible for this
to happen if their states satisfy the BFM compatibility
criterion. Furthermore, as a consequence of the classical

and quantum de Finetti theorems [18, 20, 53, 54], if the
agents can construct an exchangeable sequence of experiments then their states can be expected to converge in the
long run by application of Bayesian conditioning. Nevertheless, it is not always possible to collect more data
before a decision has to be made and, for the subjective
Bayesian, there is also the question of how to combine
sharply contradictory beliefs that do not satisfy compatibility criteria in the ﬁrst place.
The goal of this section is to provide a general methodology for quantum pooling based on applying the principles of quantum Bayesian inference, similar to the approach to state improvement developed in §VI. In the
case of shared priors, we also derive a speciﬁc pooling rule
from this methodology that was previously proposed by
Spekkens and Wiseman [10]. However, before embarking
upon this discussion, it is useful to take a step back and
look at the basic requirements for pooling and some of
the speciﬁc pooling rules that have been proposed in the
classical case.

A.

Review of pooling rules

One reasonable requirement for a pooling rule is that
the pooled state should be compatible with each agent’s
individual state assignment. If this is so then each agent
is assured that it is possible for them to be vindicated by
future observations. This is because subjective Bayesian
compatibility guarantees that, for each agent, it is possible that data could be collected that would cause the
pooled state and the agent’s individual state to become
identical upon Bayesian conditioning.
Consider the classical case where n agents assign states
Q1 (Y ), Q2 (Y ), . . . Qn (Y ) to a random variable Y . A linear opinion pool is a rule where the pooled state Qlin is
of the form
Qlin (Y ) =

n
X

wj Qj (Y ),

(76)

j=1

Pn
where 0 < wj < 1 and j=1 wj = 1. The weight wj can
be thought of as a measure of the amount of trust that
the group assigns to the jth agent. The state Qlin (Y )
is BFM compatible with every Qj (Y ) because eq. (76)
is an ensemble decomposition of Qlin (Y ) in which each
agent’s state appears. A linear opinion pool is typically
less sharply peaked than the individual agents’ assignments. In particular its entropy cannot be lower than
that of the lowest entropy individual state. It may be appropriate to use it as a diplomatic solution. Indeed, this
sort of pooling rule may be applied even if the agents’
state assignments are not pairwise compatible.
Linear opinion pools can be straightforwardly generalized to the quantum case. Speciﬁcally, if n agents assign
(1)
(2)
(n)
states σB , σB , . . . σB to a quantum region B, then a
quantum linear opinion pool is a rule where the pooled
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(lin)

state σB

is of the form
(lin)
σB

=

n
X

(j)

wj σB ,

(77)

j=1

P
where 0 < wj < 1 and nj=1 wj = 1. Similar remarks
apply to this as to the classical case.
Classically a multiplicative opinion pool [62] is a rule
whereby the pooled state is of the form
Qmult (Y ) = c

n
Y

Qj (Y )wj ,

(78)

j=1

(0)

where c is a normalization constant,
c = P Qn
Y

1

wj
j=1 Qj (Y )

.

(79)

Multiplicative pools typically result in a pooled state that
is more sharply peaked than any of the individual agent’s
states. Normalizability implies that multiplicative pools
can only be applied to states that are jointly compatible,
meaning that there is at least one value y of Y such that
Qj (Y = y) > 0 for all j. Any such value has nonzero
weight in Qmult (Y ), which guarantees that Qmult (Y ) is
compatible with every agent’s individual assignment. As
shown below, a multiplicative pool may be appropriate
in an objective Bayesian framework where all the agents
start with a shared uniform prior and the diﬀerences in
their state assignments result from having collected different data.
In order to account for the case where the shared prior
is not uniform, the multiplicative pool has to be generalized to
Qgmult (Y ) = c

n
Y

decision maker (Debbie the supra-Bayesian) would assign, where Rj is a random variable that ranges over
all possible state assignments that the jth agent might
make; and a prior P0 (Y ), which can often just be taken
to be the uniform distribution or a shared prior that
the agents may have agreed upon at some point in the
past before their opinions diverged. They can then update P0 (Y ) to P0 (Y |R1 = Q1 , R2 = Q2 , . . . , Rn = Qn )
via Bayesian conditioning and use this as the pooled
state Qsupra (Y ). Pooling then becomes just an application of the state improvement method discussed in
the previous section. In the quantum case, the equiv(0)
alent ingredients are a hybrid likelihood ρR1 R2 ...Rn |B and

Qj (Y )wj ,

(80)

a prior quantum state ρB , and then the pooled state
(supra)
(0)
is σB
= ρ
(1)
(2)
(n) , which can be
B|R1 =σB ,R2 =σB ,...,Rn =σB

computed from quantum Bayesian conditioning.
Admittedly, it might be a pretty tall order to expect
the agents to be able to act together as a ﬁctional supraBayesian Debbie, but this method does allow conditions
under which the diﬀerent pooling rules should be used
to be derived rigorously, which in turn gives insight into
when they might be useful as rules-of-thumb more generally. It also has the advantage that it allows quantum
generalizations to be derived unambiguously, since the
necessary tools of quantum Bayesian inference have been
developed in [1] and the preceding sections. In particular,
it resolves the ambiguity surrounding the correct quantum generalization of the multiplicative opinion pool.
To illustrate this, we show that, in the case of shared
priors, the supra-Bayesian approach can be used to motivate the two-agent case of the quantum generalized multiplicative pool with w0 = −1, w1 = 1, w2 = 1.

C.

The case of shared priors

j=0

where the extra state Q0 (Y ) represents the shared prior
information.
Unlike with linear pools, it is not immediately obvious
how to generalize multiplicative pools to the quantum
case because the product of states in eq. (80) does not
have a unique generalization due to non-commutativity.
B.

General methodology for state pooling

As with the other problems tackled in this paper, pooling rules should be derived in a principled way from
the rules of Bayesian inference, rather than simply being posited. One way to do this to adopt the supraBayesian approach. This works by requiring the group
of agents to put themselves in the shoes of Debbie the
decision maker who we met in the state improvement
section. Speciﬁcally, in the classical case, acting together, they are asked to come up with a likelihood
function P0 (R1 , R2 , . . . , Rn |Y ) that they think a neutral

For simplicity, we specialize to the case of a group of
two agents, Wanda and Theo. First consider the classical case where Wanda and Theo have individual state
assignments Q1 (Y ) and Q2 (Y ). We assume that Wanda
and Theo started from a shared prior P (Y ), which can
be used as Debbie’s prior P0 (Y ) = P (Y ) in the supraBayesian approach, and that the current diﬀerences in
Wanda and Theo’s state assignments are due to having collected diﬀerent data. The additional data available to Wanda and Theo are modeled as values x1 and
x2 of random variables X1 and X2 respectively. Before
learning the values of X1 and X2 , Wanda and Theo
assigned likelihood functions P (X1 |Y ) and P (X2 |Y ),
which, when combined with the prior P (Y ), determine
their current state assignments via Bayes’ theorem, i.e.
Qj (Y ) = P (Y |Xj = xj ).
We assume that it is possible to assign a joint likelihood
function P (X1 , X2 |Y ), such that P (X1 |Y ) and P (X2 |Y )
are obtained by marginalization. It is unrealistic to think
that Wanda and Theo must specify this joint likelihood
in detail. Fortunately, in order to obtain a generalized
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multiplicative pool, they need only agree on some of its
broad features. In particular, if they agree that minimal
suﬃcient statistics for X1 and X2 are conditionally independent given Y , then supra-Bayesian pooling gives rise
to a generalized multiplicative pool.
Theorem VII.1. If a minimal sufficient statistic for
X1 with respect to Y and a minimal sufficient statistic for X2 with respect to Y are conditionally independent given Y , then the supra-Bayesian pooled state
Qsupra (Y ) = P0 (Y |R1 = Q1 , R2 = Q2 ) is given by
Qsupra (Y ) = c

Q1 (Y )Q2 (Y )
,
P (Y )

(81)

where c is a normalization factor, independent of Y .
Comparing this result with eq. (80) shows that this
is a generalized multiplicative pool with Q0 (Y ) = P (Y ),
w0 = −1, w1 = 1 and w2 = 1. In the special case of a
uniform prior, this reduces to
Qsupra (Y ) = c′ Q1 (Y )Q2 (Y ),

(82)

′

where c is a diﬀerent normalization constant. This is a
multiplicative pool with w1 = 1 and w2 = 1.
Proof of theorem VII.1. By deﬁnition,
the supraBayesian pooled state is Qsupra (Y ) = P (Y |R1 =
Q1 , R2 = Q2 ) and this can be computed from the prior
P (Y ) and the likelihood P (R1 , R2 |Y ) via Bayes’ theorem. Now, Rj can be thought of as a function-valued
statistic for Xj via Rj (xj ) = P (Y |Xj = xj ). It is a
minimal suﬃcient statistic with respect to Y because
Rj (xj ) = Rj (x′j ) iﬀ P (Y |Xj = xj ) = P (Y |Xj = x′j ).
By assumption, there exist minimal suﬃcient statistics
for X1 and for X2 that are conditionally independent
given Y . However, any minimal suﬃcient statistic is a
bijective function of any other minimal suﬃcient statistic
for the same variable, so if any pair of such statistics are
conditionally independent then they all are. Therefore,
R1 and R2 are conditionally independent given Y , and
so by CI4:
P (R1 , R2 |Y ) = P (R1 |Y )P (R2 |Y ).

(83)

The terms P (Rj |Y ) can be inverted via Bayes’ theorem
to obtain P (Rj |Y ) = P (Y |Rj )P (Rj )/P (Y ), which gives
P (Y |R1 )P (Y |R2 )
.
P (R1 , R2 |Y ) = P (R1 )P (R2 )
P (Y )2

(84)

Using Bayes’ theorem again in the form P (Y |R1 , R2 ) =
P (R1 , R2 |Y )P (Y )/P (R1 , R2 ) gives
P (Y |R1 , R2 ) =

P (R1 )P (R2 ) P (Y |R1 )P (Y |R2 )
,
P (R1 , R2 )
P (Y )

(85)

which, upon substituting the announced values of R1 and
R2 , gives
Qsupra (Y ) =

P (R1 = Q1 )P (R2 = Q2 )
P (R1 = Q1 , R2 = Q2 )
P (Y |R1 = Q1 )P (Y |R2 = Q2 )
. (86)
×
P (Y )

The term c = [P (R1 = Q1 )P (R2 = Q2 )] /P (R1 =
Q1 , R2 = Q2 ) is independent of Y , so it can
be
P determined from the normalization constraint
Y Qsupra (Y ) = 1. Also, lemma V.5 implies P (Y |Rj =
Qj ) = Qj (Y ), so we have
Qsupra (Y ) = c

Q1 (Y )Q2 (Y )
,
P (Y )

(87)

as required.
In the quantum case, Wanda and Theo have individual
(2)
(1)
state assignments σB and σB . Again, any diﬀerences
in Wanda and Theo’s state assignments are assumed to
arise from having collected diﬀerent data, before which
they agreed upon a shared prior ρB , which can be used
(0)
as Debbie’s prior state ρB = ρB in the supra-Bayesian
approach.
Again, we assume that Wanda and Theo have observed values x1 and x2 of random variables X1 and X2 ,
with likelihood operators, ρX1 |B and ρX2 |B . Wanda and
Theo’s states result from conditioning the shared prior
on their data using these likelihoods. We assume that
there is a joint likelihood ρX1 X2 |B , of which Wanda and
Theo’s likelihoods are marginals. Wanda and Theo need
not agree on the full details of this joint likelihood, only
that minimal suﬃcient statistics for X1 and X2 satisfy
QCI4, which is slightly weaker than conditional independence. We then have
Theorem VII.2. If a minimal sufficient statistic t1 for
X1 with respect to B and a minimal sufficient statistic t2
for X2 with respect to B satisfy
ρt1 (X1 )t2 (X2 )|B = ρt1 (X1 )|B ρt2 (X2 )|B ,

(88)

(supra)

=

then the supra-Bayesian pooled state σB
(0)
σ
(1)
(2) is given by
B|R1 =σB ,R2 =σB

(supra)

σB

(1)

(2)

= cσB ρ−1
B σB

(89)

where c is a normalization factor, independent of B.
Eq. (89) is the quantum generalization of the generalized multiplicative pool with w0 = −1, w1 = 1, w2 = 1.
Despite appearances, this expression is symmetric under
exchange of 1 and 2. This follows from the condition (88),
which implies that ρt1 (X1 )|B and ρt2 (X2 )|B must commute.
When ρB is a maximally mixed state, eq. (89) reduces to
(supra)

σB

(1) (2)

= c′ σB σB ,

(90)

where c′ is a diﬀerent normalization constant. This is a
quantum generalization of the multiplicative pool with
w1 = 1, w2 = 1.
Although conditional independence of the minimal
suﬃcient statistics was assumed in the classical case,
eq. (88) is strictly weaker than conditional independence,
as explained in §V A.
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Proof of theorem VII.2. By deﬁnition,
the supra(supra)
Bayesian pooled state is σB
= ρB|R1 =σ(1) ,R2 =σ(2)
B
B
and this can be computed from the prior ρB and the
likelihood ρR1 R2 |B via Bayes’ theorem. Each Rj is an
operator-valued statistic for Xj via Rj (xj ) = ρB|Xj =xj .
They are minimal suﬃcient statistics with respect to B
because Rj (xj ) = Rj (x′j ) iﬀ ρB|Xj =xj = ρB|Xj =x′j . By
assumption, there exist minimal suﬃcient statistics, t1
and t2 , for X1 and X2 that satisfy
ρt1 (X1 )t2 (X2 )|B = ρt1 (X1 )|B ρt2 (X2 )|B ,

(91)

but since any minimal suﬃcient statistic is a bijective
function of any other minimal suﬃcient statistic for the
same variable, R1 and R2 must also satisfy
ρR1 R2 |B = ρR1 |B ρR2 |B .

(92)

The terms ρRj |B can be inverted via Bayes’ theorem to

obtain ρRj |B = ρB|Rj ⋆ ρRj ρ−1
B , which gives


 

ρR1 R2 |B = ρB|R1 ⋆ ρR1 ρ−1
ρB|R1 ⋆ ρR1 ρ−1
.
B
B
(93)
Since R1 and R2 are classical, the operators ρRj commute
with everything else and so expanding the ⋆-products
gives
−1

−1

2
ρR1 R2 |B = ρR1 ρR2 ρB 2 ρB|R1 ρ−1
B ρB|R2 ρB .

(94)

Using Bayes’ theorem again in the form ρB|R1 R2 =

ρR1 R2 |B ⋆ ρB ρ−1
R1 R2 and noting that ρR1 R2 commutes
with everything else gives

−1
ρB|R1 R2 = ρR1 ρR2 ρ−1
(95)
R1 R2 ρB|R1 ρB ρB|R2 ,
which, upon substituting the announced values of R1 and
R2 , gives
(supra)

σB

=

ρR1 =σ(1) ρR2 =σ(2)
B

B

ρR1 =σ(1) ,R2 =σ(2)
B

B

× ρB|R1 =σ(1) ρ−1
B ρB|R2 =σ(2) , (96)
B

B

i

h

The term c = ρR1 =σ(1) ρR2 =σ(2) /ρR1 =σ(1) ,R2 =σ(2) is inB
B
B
B
dependent of B, so it can
from the normal be determined

(supra)
ization constraint TrB σB
= 1. Also, lemma V.8
(j)

implies ρB|Rj =σ(j) = σB , so we have
B

(supra)

σB

(1)

(2)

= cσB ρ−1
B σB ,

(97)

as we set out to prove.
D.

Comparison to other approaches

Quantum state pooling has been discussed previously
in [10, 25, 28, 38, 39]. Both [25] and [38] propose pooling

methodologies that seem ad hoc from the Bayesian point
of view, but, as with Herbut’s approach to improvement,
it would be interesting to see whether they could be justiﬁed in the supra-Bayesian approach.
Jacobs [28, 39] considers quantum state pooling in the
case where Wanda and Theo arrive at their states by
making direct measurements on the system of interest. In
particular, he derives a generalization of the multiplicative rule that is distinct from the one we derive. From the
perspective of the conditional states formalism, his rule
is not a valid way of combining state assignments. The
reason is that Jacobs takes collapse rules in quantum theory — such as the von Neumann-Lüders-von Neumann
projection postulate or its generalization to POVMs —
as quantum versions of Bayesian conditioning, but in the
conditional states framework, such collapse rules are explicitly not instances of Bayesian conditioning, as argued
in §III A and [1].
Spekkens and Wiseman [10] consider the case of pooling via remote measurements, wherein there is a shared
prior state ρBA1 A2 of a tripartite system and Wanda and
Theo arrive at their diﬀering state assignments for B by
making POVM measurements on A1 and A2 respectively,
as depicted in ﬁg. 1b. They obtain the same generalized
multiplicative pool that has been derived here, namely
(2)
(1)
cσB ρ−1
B σB , for two restricted classes of states ρBA1 A2 .
Both of these classes are special cases of states for which
A1 and A2 are conditionally independent given B. If
ρBA1 A2 satisﬁes this conditional independence then so
does any hybrid state ρBX1 X2 obtained by measuring
POVMs ρX1 |A1 on system A1 and ρX2 |A2 on system A2 .
This is because the conditional mutual information cannot be increased by applying local CPT maps to A1 and
A2 . The minimal suﬃcient statistics for X1 and X2 then
also satisfy conditional independence because they are
just local processings of X1 and X2 . Therefore, the assumptions of theorem VII.2 follow from this conditional
independence. As such, the result of [10] is seen to be a
special case of the one derived here.
What we have shown is that the Spekkens and Wiseman pooling rule holds under much weaker conditions
than the conditional independence of A1 and A2 given
B. For example, it also holds for states of the form
ρBA′1 A′2 ⊗ρA′′1 A′′2 , where HAj = HA′j ⊗HA′′j and A′1 and A′2
are conditionally independent given B. For such states,
A1 and A2 are not conditionally independent given B
whenever ρA′′1 A′′2 is a correlated state, but A′′1 and A′′2
contain no information about B, so they will not be correlated with the minimal suﬃcient statistics for X1 and
X2 and consequently the minimal suﬃcient statistics are
conditionally independent given B, which is suﬃcient to
derive the result[63]. Of course, our results also signiﬁcantly generalize those of [10] because theorem VII.2 applies to a broader set of causal scenarios than just the
remote measurement scenario.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that both Jacobs
[28, 39] and Spekkens and Wiseman [10] adopt a pooling
methodology that is less widely applicable than the one
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used in the present work. In [10], for example, a fourth
party called Oswald (the overseer) is introduced into the
game, in addition to the two agents and the decisionmaker (whom they call the pooler). Before any data is
collected, everyone shares a prior ρB for the region of
interest. In addition, Wanda, Theo and Oswald assign
a shared prior ρBX1 X2 including the data variables that
Wanda and Theo are going to observe[64]. Oswald has
access to both Wanda and Theo’s data, i.e. he learns the
values x1 and x2 that Wanda and Theo observe so he
can update his state to the posterior ρB|X1 =x1 ,X2 =x2 . It
is then asserted that if Oswald’s posterior can be determined from the data available to Debbie, then this is
what she should assign as the pooled state. Since Debbie
only knows Wanda and Theo’s state assignments and the
prior ρB , this is possible only if Oswald’s posterior can
be computed from these alone.
This methodology is less widely applicable than the
one presented here because it does not specify what to do
if Debbie cannot determine Oswald’s posterior, whereas
ours does. In fact, there are situations in which the multiplicative pooling rule is applicable even though Debbie
cannot determine Oswald’s posterior using the data that
she has available. Therefore, even though the rule of
adopting Oswald’s posterior if it can be determined is
indeed correct in the supra-Bayesian approach, requiring
this is an unnecessary restriction and it is better to make
do without Oswald.
It is useful to consider how such situations can
arise.
By learning ρB|X1 =x1 and ρB|X2 =x2 , Debbie learns a minimal suﬃcient statistic for X1 with
respect to B and a minimal suﬃcient statistic for
X2 with respect to B and hence Debbie’s posterior
is ρB|R1 (X1 )=R1 (x1 ),R2 (X2 )=R2 (x2 ) , where the function
Rj (xj ) = ρB|Xj =xj is the state-valued minimal suﬃcient statistic for Xj . This is identical to Oswald’s
posterior iﬀ (R1 , R2 ) happens to be a suﬃcient statistic for the pair (X1 , X2 ) with respect to B, i.e. iﬀ
ρB|R1 (X1 )=R1 (x1 )R2 (X2 )=R2 (x2 ) = ρB|X1 =x1 X2 =x2 . In general, this is not the case, since it is only guaranteed that
R1 and R2 are locally suﬃcient for the individual data,
i.e. ρB|R1 (X1 )=R1 (x1 ) = ρB|X1 =x1 and ρB|R2 (X2 )=R2 (x2 ) =
ρB|X2 =x2 , and not globally suﬃcient for the pair. However, Debbie only has enough data to reconstruct Oswald’s posterior if they are in fact globally suﬃcient, that
is, if ρB|R1 (X1 )=R1 (x1 ),R2 (X2 )=R2 (x2 ) = ρB|X1 =x1 ,X2 =x2 .
Y

0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1

X1

0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1

X2

0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1

P (Y, X1 , X2 )

1
4

0 0

1
4

0

1
4

1
4

0

TABLE III: A prior state for which Debbie cannot determine
Oswald’s prior, but for which the multiplicative pooling rule
still holds

A classical example suﬃces to show that our pooling
rule sometimes applies even in cases where Debbie cannot reconstruct Oswald’s posterior. Suppose Y , X1 and
X2 are classical bits and Oswald’s prior is given by table III. With this assignment, the shared prior for Y
is P (Y = 0) = P (Y = 1) = 21 . Learning the value of
Xj on its own gives no further information about Y , i.e.
P (Y |Xj = xj ) = P (Y ), independently of the value of Xj ,
so both Wanda and Theo simply report the uniform distribution back to Debbie. Any minimal suﬃcient statistic
for Xj is trivial, consisting of just a single value, so the
suﬃcient statistics for X1 and X2 are trivially conditionally independent and thus our derivation of the multiplicative pooling rule holds. Unsurprisingly, in this case
it just says that Debbie should continue to assign the uniform distribution. On the other hand, knowing both the
value of X1 and the value of X2 is enough to determine
Y uniquely, so Oswald’s posterior is a point measure and
there is no way that Debbie could determine it from the
data she has available. The reason why this happens is
that all the information about Y is contained in the correlations between X1 and X2 , i.e. P (Y = 0|X1 = X2 ) = 1
and P (Y = 0|X1 6= X2 ) = 0, and Oswald is the only
agent who has access to this data.

VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we have developed a Bayesian approach
to quantum state compatibility, improvement and pooling, based on the principle that states should always be
updated by a quantum analog of Bayesian conditioning.
This improves upon previous approaches, which were
more ad hoc in nature. Due to our use of the conditional
states formalism, our results apply to a much wider range
of causal scenarios than previous approaches. Indeed, the
ability of this formalism to unify the description of many
distinct causal arrangements explains the otherwise puzzling fact that authors considering very diﬀerent causal
arrangements have found the same results. For instance,
the compatibility criterion found by Brun, Finkelstein
and Mermin in the case of remote measurements [24] is
identical to the one found by Jacobs in the case of sequential measurements [28].
This paper only represents the beginning of a Bayesian
approach to these problems; there is a lot of scope for further work. For example, it would be interesting to determine when a quantum linear pooling rule can be derived
from Bayesian principles, as it has been in the classical
case [55], and whether the results of previous methodologies for quantum state improvement and pooling can
be reconstructed from a Bayesian point of view. However, perhaps the most important lesson of this paper is
that the conditional states formalism can vastly simplify
the task of generalizing results from classical probability to the quantum domain. Deﬁnitions, theorems and
proofs can often be ported almost mechanically from classical probability to quantum theory by making use of the

29
appropriate analogies. Many aspects of quantum theory that might appear, by the lights of the conventional
quantum formalism, to have no good classical analogue,
are seen under the new formalism to be generalizations of
very familiar features of Bayesian probability theory. As
such, this new formalism helps us to focus our attention
on those aspects of quantum theory that truly distinguish
it from classical probability theory, such as violations of
Bell inequalities, the impossibility of broadcasting, and
monogamy constraints on correlations.
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